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THE CRITICISM OF CIVILIZATION IN CARLYLE AND ARNOLD

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A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

Hostility to civilization itself is, as Freud, Heller, and Trilling point out, an increasingly prevalent attitude among modern writers. Criticism of civilization originates, in its modern form at least, largely with the German Romantic poets and critics (Herder, Goethe, and Schiller), with poets like Blake, and with reactions such as Burke's to the American and French revolutions. German concern for a harmonious and diverse development of human potentialities becomes a pervading concern with such English social critics as Coleridge, Newman, Ruskin, Mill, and (of particular importance in this thesis) with Carlyle and Arnold. Early in the nineteenth century, Carlyle yokes his Calvinistic attitudes and teachings-so greatly influential in forming his later tendencies towards aristocratic hero rule. regimentation, and fear of democracy-with ideas gleaned from German writers, and thereby gives his criticism of civilization a uniqueness in spite of the similarity of his concern with problems also troubling Burke, Coleridge, and Arnold.

The writings of Goethe, Schiller, Burke, and Coleridge prompt Arnold to stress the importance of the cultural tradition of England and other nations in solving

c c , « e e e · · · · __ date for * not only the problem of imbalanced development of the individual's potentials, but also in overcoming the feeling, voiced in his poetry, of spiritual uncertainty, isolation, and despair. Like Mill, Arnold attempts to ensure the protection and use of reason, but contrary to Mill, Arnold invests inordinate authority in the state. Carlyle and Arnold both discuss the meaning and value of liberty to the individual in an industrialized democratic society. After comparing the positions of Carlyle and Arnold on themes central to their criticism of civilization, the thesis concludes by briefly indicating the direction and amplitude of this tradition of critaticism as it proceeds into the twentieth-century.




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
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Chapter 1


I

Criticism of civilization pervades Victorian literature and, for that matter, most of modern literature. with a note of urgency never before heard by western man. A paramount problem confronting modern man, as noticed by most eminent writers from the last decades of the eighteenth century to the present day, is "sickness" both in civilization and in the sceptical modern mind itself. Thomas Carlyle, for example, in a precise statement of this problem in his essay "Characteristics" (1831), says: "The state of Society in our days is, of all possible states, the least an unconscious one: this is specially the Era when all manner of Inquiries into what was once the unfelt, involuntary sphere of man's existence, find their place, and, as it were, occupy the whole domain of thought." On this self-consciosness Carlyle comments that "Unconsciousness belongs to pure unmixed life; Consciousness to a diseased mixture and conflict of life and death: Unconsciousness is the sign of creation; Consciousness, at best, that of manufacture."

Similarly, Matthew Arnold, in his persuasive article "On the Modern Element of Literature", points out:




"The predominance of thought, of reflection, in modern epochs is not without its penalties; in the unsound, in the over-tasked, in the over-sensitive, it has produced the most painful, the most lamentable results; it has produced a state of feeling unknown to less enlightened but perhaps healthier epochs -- the felling of depression, the feeling of ennui. Depression and ennui; these are the characteristics stamped on how many of the representative works of modern times!" Also, speaking of Lucretius as an example of modernity, Arnold adds that "with stern effort, with gloomy despair, he seems to rivet his eyes on the elementary reality, the naked framework of the world, because the world in its fulness and movement is too exciting a spectacle for his decompsed brain. He seems to feel the spectacle of it at once terrifying and alluring; and to deliver himself from it he has to



keep perpetually repeating his formula of disenchantment and annhilation [[and] is, therefore, overstrained, gloom-weighed, morbid."

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, two major forces sharpen these feelings of alienation and hostility towards civilization: industrialism and romanticism. These movements not only revolt against the feudal aristocracy of the classical eighteenth*century society, but, in their momentum, break with Christian tradition too. Romantics like Blake and Shelley industriously abolish religious authority to give free reign to the creative imagination, while, at almost the same time, the new forces of industrialism destroy the feudal institutions with which Christianity has been



intrinsically bound for centuries. With the loss of immediate, personal, significance in the inherited religious and social institutions, and with the awareness of that loss, there arises the "historical sense" or attitude of "historicism".

"The central factor in historicism", relates J.H.

Miller, in his article "The Disappearance of God from

Victorian Poetry", "is an assumption of the relativity

of any particular life or culture, its limitations and

fragility. The attitude of historicism accompanies the

failure of tradition, the failure of symbolic language,

the failure of all the intermediaries between man and

God. Historicism, consequently, can mean the anguish

of feeling that one is forced to carry on one's life in


terms of a mockery, of masks, and hollow gestures."

With the loss of what Schiller calls "unity of idea" or

"fundamental impulsion", reality becomes a subject—ob
ject dichotomy, alienating man from nature, society, and

himself and thus destroying his spontaneity and vitality.


J.H. Miller points out further that to "Matthew Arnold, for example, it seems that a sense of history undermines our culture and our life within that culture, until all seems artificial and sham." In his essay on Heine, Arnold says:



Modern times find themselves with an immense system of institutions, established facts, accredited dogmas, customs, rules, which have come to them from times not modern. In this system their life has to be carried forward; yet they have a sense that this system is not of their own creation, that it by no means corresponds exactly with the wants of their actual life, that, for them, it is customary, not rational. The awakening of this sense is the awakening of the modern spirit.ll


The "historical consciousness", then, makes modern man aware of his isolation, not only from other cultures, but from previous stages of his own; he cannot feel reverence for either. The thwarting of man's instinctive desires for pleasure, knowledge, creativity, and beauty with efforts to merely subsist; the perpetual persuading and cajoling of individuals by the prevailing ideal of material acquisition; the fragmentation of social unity through wealth, class, education, profession, and division of labor; man's morbid self-analysis; and the "historical sense"--all have led to an increasingly vociferous dissatisfaction with civilization itself.

Erich Heller's study of the pre-eminent German writers from Goethe to Kafka, The Disinherited Mind, is, in itself, a definitive statement of this problem of the disinheritance of modern man from most meaningful traditions of western civilization. The problem is stated most specifically, however, in Heller's discussion of the view held by Rilke and Nietzsche that human existence




is uniquely "the daring experiment: man himself must become the redeemer of existence", like Nietzsche's "Superman", for example, or through Rilke's transformation of the world into a reflection of the human will. "These two confessions of Rilke and Nietzsche." comments Heller, "clinch the whole excruciating problem that besets the spiritually disinherited mind of Europe. and raise anew the question of poetry and truth in an age dispossessed of all spiritual certainties. Without that all-pervasive sense of truth which bestows upon happier cultures their intuition of order and reality, poetry-in company with all the other arts -- will be faced with ever increasing demands for greater 'creativeness'. For the 'real order' has to be 'created' where there is no intuitive conviction that it exists." With civilization failing to provide a framework through which to conceive of a "reality", the individual is thrown entirely upon his own resources to form his own systems for attaining a harmonious unity between nature, society, and himself.

To cite a well known example of this disunity:
Nietzsche, in his famous work, The Birth of Tragedy (1872),
shows man's loss of "being at one with the world" as the
sundering of the rational and sensual sides of man; the
splitting of the rational "Apollonian" intellect and the



enraptured "Dionysian" instinct. These two opposites in man unite in history but once, according to Nietzsche, in the heights of tragic drama in Periclean Athens (429 B.C.). From this period in western civilization to the nineteenth century, imbalance results from submerging the Dionysian instinct under the Apollonian intellect. Nietzsche notes that the "theoretic optimism" widely supported throughout western hisof Socrates. tory, is actually "the joy in appearances and redemption in appearances:" a decaying process whereby myth is forced into a narrow historical limit. Myth loses the sense of immediate and absolute truth: it becomes merely an isolated historical fact with no personal relationship or meaning to the individual. Instinct, on the other hand, creates a joy founded on a "pessimistic contemplation of the world . . . the mystery doctrine of tragedy: the fundamental knowledge of the oneness of all existing things, the consideration of individuation as the primal cause of evil, and art as the joyous hope that the spell of individuation may be broken, as the augury of a restored oneness, "


Freud later notes in his <u>Civilization and Its Discontents</u> (1930) that this "spell of individuation" persists as does the attack on civilization by the discontented individual. He notes that while accepting the



possibility of lessening the human misery inflicted by nature, men reject the possibility of lessening the misery resulting from human relationships within the family, community, and state. Accepting the insolubility of social problems, such fatalists, Freud argues, hold that "our so called civilization is to blame for a great part of our misery, and we should be much happier if we were to give it up and go back to primitive conditions. I call this amazing, because—however one may define culture—it is undeniable that every means by which we try to guard ourselves against menaces from several sources of human distress is a part of this same culture."

commenting on this modern distrust of even civilization's protection and security, Lionel Trilling, in a persuasive article "On the Modern Element in Modern Literature" says the disenchantment of western culture with culture itself is a distinctive feature of modern 18 literature. Further he says, "it would seem that fewer and fewer people wish to say with Freud (in Civilization and Its Discontents) that the loss of instinctual gratification, emotional freedom, or love, are compensated for either by the security of civilized life or with the stern pleasures of the moral masculine character."

Much of this discontent, however, is with the sickly,



self-conscious "veneer" of civilization; with a "varnished" people, lacking the cultivation of the "inward
man"; with Mr. Kurtz and the "hollow men". Coleridge
in his <u>The Constitution of Church and State</u>, distinguishes between cultivation (or culture) and civilization
when he says:

The permanency of the nation . . . and its progressiveness and personal freedom . . . depend on a continuing and progressive civilization. But civilization is itself but a mixed good, if not far more a corrupting influence, the hectic disease, not the bloom of health, and a nation so distinguished more fitly to be called a varnished than a polished people, where this civilization is not grounded in cultivation in the harmonious development of those qualities and faculties that characterize our humanity. 20

Raymond Williams's <u>Culture and Society</u> (1958) is itself an illumination of this distinction between civilization and culture. Echoing J.S. Mill's argument in his essay "Civilization" (1836), Williams suggests that "civilization" is "the ordinary progress of society... [or] mechanism, amassing of fortune, utility as a source of value" while "culture" is the "highest observable state of men in society." W.H. Bruford's <u>Culture and Society in Classical Weimar 1775-1806</u> (1962), following Williams's lead, compiles four distinct meanings of the word "culture". They are: first, "the cultivation of the individual mind;" second, "the result in the individual of the process of cultivation, as in 'a man of the widest culture!"; third,

. . . . "what in German is usually called 'Kultur', in English 'civilization', and an applied not to individuals but to groups, usually whole nations"; fourth, "a whole way of life of a human society [as used by archeologists, anthropologists, and sociologists]". The modern pre-occupation with civilization and culture is evident in the multiplicity of such definitions. With these distinctions in mind--particularly the first three--Coleridge's definition of culture, as the harmonious development of our humanity, becomes a standard by which civilization is criticized throughout the rest of the nineteenth-century and into the twentieth-century.


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This standard of modern social criticism, the standard of harmonious diversity, though a distinguishing feature of renaissance humanism, has its modern origins in Germany, and, as we will see, has a profound effect on English thinking. Mill, for example, recognizes, that while Bentham sees civilization as a business—in the English empirical—utilitarian tradition—Coleridge, following the German writers, arrives with them at "a philosophy of society, in the only form in which it is yet possible, that of a philosophy of history; not a

-e . defence of particular ethical or religious doctrines, but a contribution, the largest made by any class of 24 thinkers, towards the philosophy of human culture."

The philosophy of culture roots itself in Kantian idealism, seen, for example, in Kant's famous "categorical imperative": "So act that the maxim of thy deed may stand as universal law," This rule of rational morality implies humanity must be considered an end in itself. but indirectly teaches the perfectability of man. A philosophy of human perfectability or "Humanitat" is the unifying element of the three major classical Weimar writers: Herder, Goethe, and Schiller. Herder sees civilization as a diverse, organic, unit, as do Burke, Coleridge, Carlyle, and Arnold, and, like them, he believes "that man's maxim is a ceaseless striving after perfection. or 'Bildung,'" Similar to Hegel's philosophy of history, Herder's philosophy of culture pictures history as an unravelling of God's mind with human events reflecting a part of the totality of a Divine Idea, and with man's highest self-realization coming through art, religion, and philosophy. This optimistic belief in man's nearing perfection through cultivation of his distinctly human faculties, therefore, is the basis of Herder's philosophy of culture.


In this tradition of "Humanitat" Goethe makes pos-



sibly the most striking artistic portrayal in German literature of modern man's awakening to the acuteness of his spiritual dilemma. Wilhelm Meister, for example, chooses art, specifically Shakespeare, to bring reality into focus, while on the other hand, Faust incessantly strives for knowledge of himself and his position in the universe, losing Gretchen, with all her human warmth, simplicity, and unwavering religious convictions, and pursuing the ideal beauty of Helen. After Faust loses the secure but unsatisfying devotion of Gretchen, his insatiable spirit tries to unite with Helen to find spiritual contentment. Through Faust, Goethe portrays the struggles of modern man who, when cut-off from the security of medieval faith and the stability of medieval society, strives to restore a balanced feeling of wellbeing through a revival of the humanist tradition.

Schiller, another prominent disciple of German and Greek humanism, believes the special problem of the age to be one of harmony. He states, in his comprehensive Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, that the distinct function of culture is the harmonious cultivation of man's two sides: change and immutability. He proposes:


The office of culture is to watch over *** / the two human impulsions for change and immutability/ and to secure to each one its proper limits; therefore culture has to give equal justice to both, and to



defend not only the rational impulsion against the former. Hence she has to act a twofold part: first to protect sense against the attacks of freedom; secondly, to secure personality against the power of sensation. One of these ends is attained by the cultivation of the sensuous, the other by that of the reason. 27

Similar in significant ways to Burke's observation on the split between reason and passion during the French Revolution is Schiller's statement about the imbalanced cultivation of modern man: "Man paints himself in his actions, and what is the form depicted in the drama of the present time? On the one hand, he is seen running wild, on the other in a state of lethargy; the two extremest stages of human degeneracy, and both seen in 28 one and the same period."

In the writings of Herder, Goethe, and Schiller, then, there exists an almost religious fervor for the humanistic ideal of harmonious human development as an antidote for the modern ills of imbalanced human faculties, the historical sense, and the resulting feelings of isolation and despair. In the writings of these Weimar intellectuals, therefore, are present, in embyronic form at least, many of the major currents of thought that appear in the literature, particularly in the social criticism, of the nineteenth and even twentieth centuries.



Thomas Carlyle and Matthew Arnold, two major critics of English society, are profoundly affected by these major currents of thought from Germany. In England the hostility to traditional institutions was common among utilitarians. The fanatical individualism of a triumphant liberal government, laissez-faire economy and the deplorable living and working conditions of England's working class combined to give a ringing note of urgency to the social criticism of thinkers from all political disciplines in industrialized Victorian England. Harmony or disintegration are vital concerns not only for the existence of the individual but for the existence of the state.


Both Carlyle and Arnold reveal a concern widely felt throughout the Victorian intellectual class: the desire to discover the organic threads that bind society into a united totality, bind past with present, individual with community, man with man. This desire for totality, for a diversity of opportunity that will allow a harmonious development of human faculties, is seen not only in Carlyle and Arnold, with whom we are primarily concerned in this paper, but also, for example, in such writers as Edmund Burke, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Henry Newman, Karl Marx, John Ruskin, John Stuart Mill,

• - . • and Samuel Butler.

Edmund Burke (1729-1797), in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, praises the English Constitution for moulding a "unity in so great a diversity of its The Constitution helps balance and unify the parts." diverse elements of the English nation. Coleridge (1772-1834), in The Constitution of Church and State, sets up as the standard of human perfection "the harmonious development of those qualities and faculties that characterize our humanity." In his book On the Scope and Nature of University Education, J.H. Newman (1801-1890) again stresses the need for harmony, particularly in education, which, in the nineteenth century was becoming increasingly specialized: "Suffice it then to say here that I hold very strongly that the first step in intellectual training is to impress upon a boy's mind the idea . . . of rule and exception, of richness and harmony." Marx (1818-1883) voices his particular concern about the factory worker's lack of opportunity for a diversified and harmonious development. In Capital Marx complains that capitalistic manufacturing "converts the laborer into a crippled monstrosity, by forcing his detail dexterity at the expense of a world of productive capabilities and in-Also, in "The Nature of Gothic" Ruskin (1819-1900) comments upon the division of labor: "It is not,

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
truly speaking, the labor that is divided; but the men." Later examples of this pervasive concern for totality and diversity appear in Mill's On Liberty (1859) and Butler's Erewhon (1872). Mill's superscription to On Liberty, taken from Wilhelm von Humbolt's Sphere and Duties of Government (1836), stresses, once again, the need for diversity: "The grand, leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity,"34 for the sacrifice of man's instinctive life in a highly mechanized industrial society leads Butler to wonder: "May not man himself become a sort of parasite upon the machines? An affectionate machine tickling aphid?" This distinction between diversity and specialization, and the distinction between harmony and fragmentation is a theme reiterated throughout the criticism of civilization. It is a theme to which both Carlyle and Arnold vigorously address themselves.



Ι

Any study of Thomas Carlyle's thinking inevitably encounters complexity, contradiction, and paradox: this study of his criticism of civilization is no exception. C.F. Harrold argues convincingly in Carlyle and German Thought: 1819-1834 that "when Carlyle began the study of German writers, he already had a fundamental point of view, which he wished confirmed, and ... he was 'influenced' less by actual ideas than by the spirit of German thinkers as they clothed old concepts /for Carlyle. Calvinistic/ in new forms." The beliefs of Carlyle's Scottish Calvinistic upbringing persist throughout the rest of his life too; he believes (or wishes to believe) in a God of Power; in the supreme importance, to his personal salvation, of obeying Him; and, in manifestations of faith and obedience through concrete actions rather than passive "states of grace". During his life. however, his views on the nature of obedient action completely reverse position; his earlier Promethean creativity, as we will see, later crystalizes into the immobility of a "Shellian" Zeus. The vital becomes static: the creative becomes mechanical.

This reversal in Carlyle's formula for man's "right




action" can be traced in the development of his criticism of industrial, democratic, and Protestant civilization. His early social criticism, stemming from his theory of the "Unconscious", suggests that health consists of a balance between man's parallel but opposite mental faculties: the organic versus the mechanical, the instinctive versus the intellectual, the changeable versus the immutable, the natural versus the artificial. In his essay entitled "Characteristics" (1831), Carlyle states:

The sign of health is Unconsciousness. In our inward, as in our outward world, what is mechanical lies open to us; not what is dynamical and has vitality. Of our Thinking, we might say, it is but the mere upper surface that we shape into articulate Thoughts; -- underneath the region of argument and conscious discourse, lies the region of meditation; here, in its quiet mysterious depths, dwells what vital force is in us; here, if aught is to be created, and not merely manufactured and communicated, must the work go on. Manufacture is intelligible, but trivial; Creation is great, and cannot be understood.²


After developing this theory of the unconscious, he praises man's masculine duty of shaping and controlling human destiny by work or action originating in the unconscious, creative instinct. For Carlyle, this work is free of contaminating sensual and aesthetic pleasure;

eign to Goethe, Schiller, and other German writers so profoundly influential to the shape, if not the basis, of Carlyle's thinking. Carlyle's concluding critical



position, however, is an opposite extreme to his initial theory of the unconscious: his earlier views on the necessity of changing institutions to meet immediate needs in society, arising from his early theory of the operation of the unconscious, shifts to a position where he demands strict suppression of rebelliousness, a position defended in his later essay, "Shooting Niagara" (1867).

Meanwhile, from studying what he calls "the new criticism" of the German school of literary critics; namely, Kant, Goethe, Schiller, Herder, Richter, and the Schlegels, Carlyle claims the unconscious to be the mysterious force producing the "natural genius" vital to the superiority of Shakespeare's drama. Carlyle then extends the use of the theory of the unconscious as a standard for literary criticism to a standard of social criticism. The native tradition of English conservative rationalism, seen in men like Burke, Coleridge, and Carlyle, as well as the rational tradition in Germany (Kant, Goethe, Schiller), still is influenced, in varying degrees, by the romantic notion of primitivism; a belief, as Lois Whitney points out in her informative book, Primitivism and the Idea of Progress, that frequently confuses and intertwines itself with the belief in progress. Essentially, primitivism is the belief that the model of human excellence is the earliest condition of



man and his human society. Reacting to Hume's empirical philosophy and eighteenth-century scepticism, the early nineteenth-century conservative rationalists find the belief in primitivism compatible with their views of man's inate moral knowledge. Into his theory of the unconscious, then, Carlyle incorporates the notion of intuitive moral knowledge and the excellence of the primitive, or, for him, really the prelapsarian:

All science ... originated in the feeling of something being wrong, so it is and continues to be but Division, Dismemberment, and partial healing of the wrong. ... Had Adam remained in paradise, there had been no Anatomy and no Metaphysics. ... The memory of that first state of Freedom and paradisatic Unconsciousness has faded away into an ideal poetic dream.

Later, however, as seen in such works as <u>Sartor</u>

<u>Resartus</u> (1833-1834), Carlyle modifies the teachings of some German writers, particularly Goethe's, to suit his own Calvinistic background, and thereby conquers his depression of 1819, a depression resulting from scepticism and loss of his profound belief in the correctness of his Calvinistic convictions. As an example of Carlyle's modification of Goethe's doctrines, Harrold compares their concepts of renunciation or "entsagen":

Entsagen meant for him /Goethe/ something closely analogous to the artist's "selecting", ordering, and shaping of his materials. This involves a denial of the artist's momentary impulses, his tendency to yield to the opposing material, to snatch a quick result. ... It is fundamentally a creative act, an



effort at a constant envisaging of the whole.

On the other hand, Harrold notes that in <u>Sartor Resartus</u>


Carlyle has Teufelsdrockh cure his depression, as Carlyle himself did, when Teufelsdröckh

"merges his Me in the Idea," identifies himself, at least for the moment of his experience, completely with the Absolute, annhilates every atom of his individuality. Carlyle increasingly talked about renunciation, and in proportion as he did so ceased talking about capabilities and self-culture. Entsagen came more and more to mean for him a puritan denial of self, a chastising of nat-qural impulses in order to attain a spiritual good.

Gradually, Carlyle works his Calvinistic background and his modified German Romanticism into his theory of the unconscious, and from his theory not only finds an optimistic outlook on life but also constructs a workable standard for social criticism.

By 1829, in his essay "Signs of the Times", Carlyle reveals the essence of his social criticism that springs from his theory of the unconscious when he pinpoints civilization's problem as imbalanced cultivation of parallel but opposite areas of human activity. He says:

It seems clear enough that only in the right co-ordination of the two /departments of man's activity, the dynamical and the mechanical, and the vigorous forwarding of both, does our true line of action lie. Undue cultivation of the inward or Dynamical province leads to idle, visionary, impracticable courses, to Superstition and Fanaticism, to Undue cultivation of the outward, again, though less immediately prejudicial, and even for the time productive of many palpable benefits, must, in the long run, by destroying Moral Force, to prove not



less certainly, and perhaps still more hopelessly, pernicious. This, we take it, is the grand characteristic of our age. By our skill in Mechanism, . . in the management of external things we excel all other ages; while in whatever respect the pure moral nature, in true dignity of soul and character, we are perhaps inferior to most civilized ages.

Carlyle prescribes the role of the unconscious in social criticism more fully when he stresses the need for spontaneity of action: "In our inward, as in our outward world, what is mechanical lies open to us: not what is dynamical and has vitality." Following the reaction of Kant and Hegel to Hume's premise that logical distinction can be made between reason, fact, and value, Carlyle deprecates logic and praises sentiment:

The moral sentiments and the massive feelings of religious reverence and loyalty to the community that Rousseau had glorified were supposed to embody a deeper wisdom than that of mere logical clarity,

. . This respect for sentiment and community carried with it a new estimate of the value of custom and tradition. 10

As Sabine's <u>History of Political Theory</u> points out,

Carlyle gives a typical instance of the way in which the

romantic conservatives "tugged lustily at the logical

chain by which Hume was so coldly towing them and the

world into the bottomless abysses of Atheism and Fatalism."

For Carlyle, then, logic is an "external" faculty of

the intellect, incapable of unfolding "internal", intuitive


truths embodied in the unconscious traditions and

customs of the race or nation.

* .

Reason, on the other hand, is, according to Carlyle, in the Romantic tradition of Coleridge and Wordsworth, the faculty that probes the super-sensible, the spiritual, the world of "things in themselves" (noumenon). Carlyle's definition of reason differs from Kant's: for Kant, "Pure Reason" cannot deal with the super-sensible, God, and immortality as metaphysical absolutes; rather, rational principles are validly employed within areas of human experience alone. Kantian "concepts", the general forms of objects, are ideas known intuitively by men. These concepts, as the framework for empirical knowledge, need empirical data to become objective knowledge; they reveal how experience is ordered but reveal no super-sensible absolutes. "Practical Reason" (moral). on the other hand, converts the unsatisfiable urge to reach this unattainable super-sensible absolute into a healthy impulse. This impulse carries empirical enquiries to the greatest possible systematization of our knowledge. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant showed the moral law to be the absolute content or substance of religion, thus indicating to Fichte that men act by faith rather than by knowledge. Fichte argues that moral reason is the basis of all reason, that God is the moral Similarly, Carlyle argues: order of the universe.

The Moral Sense, thank God, is a thing you never




will "account for"; that, if you could think of it, is the perennial Miracle of Man; in all times, visibly connecting poor transitory Man here on this bewildered Earth with his Maker, who is Eternal in the Heavens. 14

Again he says: "The healthy Understanding, we should say, is not the Logical, argumentative, but the Intuitive; for the end of Understanding is not to prove and find 15 reasons, but to know and believe." Intuitive understanding, reason, and faith are included in what Carlyle calls the "unconscious"; however, the unconscious is also to be regarded as a force of Divine guidance: "Let the free, reasonable Will, which dwells in us, as in our Holy of Holies, be indeed free, and obeyed like a Divinity, 16 as is its right and its effort."

With this theory of the unconscious, emphasizing balance, health, and faith, Carlyle attains remarkable insight into problems of his industrialized society.

"It is in society," notes Carlyle "that man first feels 17 what he is; first becomes what he can be." Here too Carlyle postulates: "again in the Body Politic, as in the animal body, the sign of right performance is Unleonsciousness." In comparing the Roman Republic to nineteenth-century England, for example, Carlyle attributes to the former a healthy sense of wholeness; to the latter, a self-conscious, sickly disunity of thought and action. Regretting the loss of a sense of community,



he reflects:


The individual man was in himself a whole, or complete union; and could combine with his fellows as the living member of a greater whole. For all men, through their life, were animated by one great Idea; thus all efforts pointed one way, everywhere there was wholeness. 19

Like Schiller, Coleridge, Arnold, Ruskin, Marx, and Morris, Carlyle sees modern man as living in an artificial, mechanical world, alienated from other individuals and even from themselves. The modern worker, especially, devotes himself to a particular area of human activity to maintain industry and government. Hostility then develops between the activities in society and the faculties in the individual. A release from this dilemma of alienation from oneself and others comes, according to Carlyle, only from a return to faith and unconsciousness:

The principle of life, which now struggles painfully, in the outer, thin and barren domain of the Conscious or Mechanical, may then withdraw into its inner sanctuaries, its abysses of mystery and miracle; withdraw deeper than ever into that domain of the Unconscious, by nature infinite and inexhaustible; and creatively work there.

II

Carlyle realizes that the need for cultivating the creative unconscious is greatest in the "inner sanctuaries" or capacities for distinctly human experience: religion, particularly, and its offspring literature, need



rejuvenating, heroic action to cast off scepticism.

Commenting on the sickness of modern religion, Carlyle contrasts the condition of religion in pre-industrial and modern industrial times:


Philosophy lay hid under it, peaceably included in it. Herein, as in the life-centre of all, lay the true health and oneness. Only at a later era must Religion split itself into Philosophies; and thereby, the vital union of Thought being lost, disunion and mutual collision in all provinces of Speech and Action more and more prevail. Mother Church has, to the most, become a super-anuated Step-mother, whose lessons go disregarded; or are spurned at, and scornfully gainsaid.21

For Carlyle, religion based on conscious, sceptical philosophy is sickly, divided, and moribund; religion based on mystery and faith is healthy, whole, and vital.

Indeed, in <u>Sartor Resartus</u>, Carlyle strikes at the roots of the modern religious dilemma. He attempts to revitalize modern religion by resurrecting basic religious truths and expressing them in the fresh, conspicuous form of "Sartorism", or "Clothes Philosophy". He sees religious institutions as "Church-Clothes" or:

The Forms, the <u>Vestures</u>, under which men have at various periods embodied and represented for themselves the Religious Principle; that is to say, invested the Divine Idea of the World with a sensible and practically active Body, so that it might dwell among them as a living and life-giving Word.²²

Metaphysics and philosophy, conversely, are, to Carlyle, mechanical tools producing esoteric religious terminology, but incapable of making religious truths meaning-




ful and immediate to all.

Literature, being a branch of religion, suffers from the same malady; namely, self-questioning and mechan-

ical action. Carlyle cites two symptoms of the disease of modern literature: "View-hunting" and "Reviewing". Byron, as an example of view-hunting, follows the preromantic popularization of landscape painting by poetizing descriptions of scenery, mainly as a mechanical formula for popularity. To Carlyle, Byron represents the pessimism and sentimentality widespread throughout early nineteenth-century society. Criticizing the prevalence of this unhealthy state of the modern mind, Carlyle notes in Past and Present that Byron, "feeling too surely that he for his part is not 'happy', declares the same in very violent language, as a piece of news that may be interesting. ... Byron's large audience indicates how true it (the significance of his unhappiness) is felt to be." Goethe, by contrast, represents the hopefulness and creativity of "the higher Literature of Germany, /in which/ there already lies, for him that can read it, the beginning of a new revelation of the Godlike; as yet unrecognized by the mass of the world." fore, to cure the modern pessimism Carlyle suggests: "Close thy Byron; open thy Goethe."

To Carlyle, himself a major reviewer, "Reviewing"



is as representative of modern self-consciousness as
"View-hunting". Carlyle shares a prejudice of his
times in accusing eighteenth and nineteenth-century literary critics of frivolously analysing form to the neglect of imaginative and "religious" content. "Literature
has become one boundless self-devouring Review," says
Carlyle in "Characteristics"; "thus does Literature,
like a sick thing, superabundantly 'listen to itself.'"
Both religion and literature, therefore, fail to express
spiritual certainties, and, for Carlyle, consequently
fail to cure the "neurosis" of modern civilization.

Again, in <u>Sartor Resartus</u>, Carlyle notes that religion and literature no longer exist as organic threads connecting men of past and present generations of human civilization. He castigates utilitarian government and "laissez-faire" economic theory for their disintegrating effect on social unity:


'Call ye that a Society' . . . where there is no longer any Social Idea extant; not so much as the Idea of a common Home, but only of a common over-crowded lodging-house. Where each, isolated, regardless of his neighbor, clutches what he can get and cries "Mine!" and calls it Peace, . . . Where your priest has no tongue but for plate-licking: and your Guides and Governors cannot guide. 27

Opposing the "atomic" or inorganic utilitarian view of society, where each individual is an isolated self-interested member, is the social philosophy of Fichte and Car-

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lyle. Society, for them, is the preserver and distributer of man's traditional knowledge, especially his moral knowledge; consequently, loss of social unity inhibits perfection of the individual's moral reason. Carlyle. therefore, condemns utilitarianism and "laissez-faire" economics for inhibiting moral perfection and hence for precluding superior leadership; the fear of reducing qualities of human excellence to mediocrity is a frequent concern to him. If, as the utilitarians claim. society is best motivated by competition between individuals rather than by leadership, then the utilitarians should be able to relieve the ill effects on man of the modern mechanical civilization: "cannot /these utilitarians/ fathom the Doctrine of Motives, and cunningly compute these, and mechanize them to grind the other wav." Since Benthamite utilitarianism claims to calculate the motives and useful consequences of each action, it should be capable of solving the sickness of civilization; but, however, Carlyle argues:

In contradiction to much Profit-and-Loss Philosophy, speculative and practical, ... /the/ Soul is not synonymous with Stomach; ... therefore, in our Friend's words, 'that, for man's well-being, Faith is properly the one thing needful; how, with it, Martyrs, otherwise weak can cheerfully endure the shame and the cross; and without it, Worldlings puke-up their sick existence, by suicide, in the midst of luxury;' ... that these men, Liberals, Utilitarians, or whatsoever they are called, will



ultimately carry their point, and dissever and destroy most existing Institutions of Society, seems a thing which has some time ago ceased to be doubtful. 29


In his book, <u>Carlyle's Life in London</u>, J.A. Froude describes Carlyle's political position:

He was a Bedouin, as he said of himself, a rough child of the desert. His hand had been against every man, and every man's hand against him. He had offended of all political parties, and every professor of a recognized form of religion. He had offended Tories by his Radicalism, and Radicals by his scorn for formulas. He had offended High Churchmen by his Protestantism, and Low Churchmen by his evident unorthodoxy. No sect or following could claim him as belonging to them; if they did some rough utterance would soon undeceive them. 30

Although Carlyle agrees with the utilitarians that change is necessary, he disagrees about the nature of change. He desires, especially, a change of heart, a change in thinking, and a change of institutions that would, above all, reflect a new awareness of religious truths; and these truths must be represented in a "mythology" that is meaningful to all members of society.


Custom, on the other hand, blinds men from truth:
it destroys man's sense of wonder and belief in a spiritual reality; consequently, mechanical conformity dictates beliefs that are not of the individual's own choos-

ing. Deviating from his usual praise of the unconscious, Carlyle, like Mill, admits philosphy struggles to release man from the bondage of conformity: "What is Philosophy



throughout but a continual battle against Custom; an ever-renewed effort to transcend the sphere of blind 31 Custom, and so become Transcendental?" Desire for universal moral order, fundamental to all religion, as both Carlyle and Fichte would agree, transcends both abstract philosophical systems and unquestioning conformity to custom. To Carlyle this moral desire is embodied specifically in the unconscious: "Thus is true Moral genius, ... 'ever a secret unto itself'. . . But with regard to Morals strictly so called, it is in Society, we might almost say, that Morality begins."

Properly enough for a man born into the working class, Carlyle's theory of the unconscious leads his criticism of civilization into the immediately practical area of labor. The core of his criticism concerning the deplorable working conditions is not the physical but the psychological pains incumbent on the worker. The laborer's inability to earn a living produces not only hunger and other physical miseries, but unhappiness, boredom, and despair. Unlike Marx and Ruskin, however, Carlyle does not complain about the debasing character of the work done: he goes back beyond his German phileosophy and beyond his contemporary social criticism, to his Calvinistic upbringing for a glorification of work itself. Work has a religious significance, but in his




time men have the consolation of neither work nor religion. Carlyle notes:

Labour, effort, is the very interruption of that ease, which man foolishly enough fancies to be his happiness; and yet without labour there were no ease, no rest, so much as conceivable. ... The true wretchedness lies here: that the difficulty remain and the Strength be lost; the Pain cannot relieve itself in free Effort; that we have the labour and want the Willingness.

Inadequate wages, brutal working conditions, and squalid living quarters strip the workers of faith in himself and society and cast him into cynicism, despair, and eventual violence; but, adds Carlyle, "the sum of man's misery is even this, that he feels himself crushed under the Juggernaut wheels, and knows that Juggernaut is no divinity, but a dead mechanical idol." Without the solace of religious faith or satisfying employment, physical power seems to dominate man's life, as when Carlyle notes how "widely this veneration for the physically strongest has spread itself through Literature" and other areas of human activity.

In spotlighting the modern pathological envy of physical power, he presents the unconscious as a neglected but equally important source of power. In Heroes and Hero Worship he describes the hero as motivated by instinct, as a leader empowered with visionary insight, capable of piercing customary assumptions, and reforming




the mechanical sterility of society. The hero ennobles the conscious by drawing upon the resources of the unconscious to deal with practical and human problems; dynamic power conquers and manipulates mechanical power. The hero realizes that "Habit is our primal, fundamental law; Habit and Imitation, there is nothing more perennial in us than these two, /but the hero also knows that these/ Formulas become dead ... in the progress of living 36 growth," and must be revitalized. The hero's insight dictates the needed reforms, but raw physical power is transformed by moral power.

In Past and Present, Carlyle's major examination of the social conditions of industrial England, Abbot Samson exemplifies Carlyle's idea of the heroic individual, his theory that history is the biographies of great men. Carlyle contrasts Abbot Samson's courageous leadership and sincere action with the self-interest of both nineteenth-century aristocracy and irresponsible "laissez-faire" government. Abbot Samson's intuitive sense of justice ennobles his leadership: "Abbot Samson showed no extraordinary favor to the Monks who had been his familiars of old [10] [and] he had learned to judge better than Lawyers." He wrestles with spiritual as well as material problems; his insight, sincerity, and desire for justice inspires self-sacrificing dedication

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to duty and work: "A great Law of Duty, ... dwarfing all else, annihilating all else--/makes/ royal Richard 38 as small as peasant Samson." As hero, Samson renounces the solace and protection of group membership and the guidance of custom that comforts the ordinary man; but, although isolated in this sense, he gains reinforcement from his insight into the problems of men. Samson commands the reverence of his followers because he is acknowledged as a "thinker with ability" and because his rule maintains their expectations of justice. Paradoxically, the hero, as the ideal individual, inspires ideal collective action and duty.

The ordinary man's relationship to the hero is one of obedience, loyalty, and reverence. In his essay "Chartism", Carlyle says that the "relation of the taught to their teacher, of the loyal subject to their guardian king, is, under one shape or another, the vital element of human Society." Again, in Past and Present, he notes that to "learn obeying is the fundamental art of governing." Obedience through hero-worship replaces "cash-payment" as the social contract under the "laissezfaire". utilitarian political economy. Obedience to inspired heroes, according to Carlyle, most readily adapts mankind to necessary changes in civilization's institutions. Praising a heroically led society, Carlyle



and all; whether by the soft binding of Love, or the iron chaining of Necessity." Heroes of the past generation, preserved by their works in "Institutions, Politics, 44 Churches, above all in Books," still command respect and obedience:


It is thus that the heroic heart, the seeing eye of the first times, still feels and sees in us of the latest; that the Wise Man stands ever encompassed, and spiritually embraced, by a cloud of witnesses and brothers; and there is a living, literal Communion of Saints, wide as the World itself, and as the History of the World.

To Carlyle, then the body of heroes, past and present, represents cultural peaks or embodiments of the ideal of human perfection to which ordinary men must strive. The ordinary man, therefore, must show "an obedience which knows no bounds."

To justify the hero's demand for obedience from the uninspired masses, however, Carlyle prescribes certain qualities of the hero, differentiating the hero from an irresponsible tyrant. Says E. Cassirer in the Myth of the State:

What Carlyle meant by "heroism" or "leadership" was by no means the same as what we find in our modern theories of fascism. According to Carlyle there are two criteria by which we can easily distinguish the true hero from the sham hero: his "insight" and his "sincerity". Carlyle could never think or speak of lies as necessary or legitimate weapons in the great political struggles. 47

Although Carlyle says that "might makes right" in the



"might" is of a moral rather than a physical sense; heroworship means, for Carlyle, worship of a moral force.


Even though his childhood indoctrination in Calvinism gives him a profound distrust of man's nature—man, being in a fallen state, and tending towards sin, must, to be saved, obey the will of a stern, powerful God—Carlyle is confident and optimistic enough to assume and assert that "man never yields himself wholly to brute force,

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but always to moral greatness."

The problem of recognizing the hero and of the hero attaining a following now arises; it is a problem crucial for Carlyle's ideal society and one that Carlyle never completely solves. He states in Past and Present that given

the men a people choose, the People itself, in its exact worth and worthlessness, is given. A heroic people chooses heroes, and is happy; a valet or flunky people chooses sham heroes, what are called quacks, thinking them heroes, and is not happy. The grand summary of Man's spiritual condition is this question put to him, What man dost thou honour?"49

Only the cultivated person, himself possessing in some degree a hero's insight, is able to recognize the true hero. Paradoxically, Carlyle suggests that the uncultivated, the uneducated, and, in a sense, the "unconscious" mind cannot recognize heroes. He proposes education to



be a means of awakening man's latent awareness of truly heroic traits. It is clear that for Carlyle education must be more than the inculcation of facts; it must be what the word itself means: a drawing out, a fostering of man's inherent powers of imagination and insight, in short, the encouragement of a vital process, not the imposition of a mechanical one. In "Chartism", Carlyle asks:

Were it not a cruel thing to see . . . the inhabitants living all mutilated in their limbs, each strong man with his right arm lamed? How much crueler to find the strong soul, with its eyes sealed, its eyes extinct so that it sees not. 50

Carlyle's most urgent demand for civil reform is in education. He criticizes the government for meeting inadequately its "first function" of promoting, as a beginning, a plan for "at least schoolmaster's education." Education, for Carlyle, is a means of possibly solving, not only such critical social problems as unemployment, poor wages, and intolerable living and working conditions, but also the most crucial problem confronting modern society; namely, degeneration of religion into scepticism and diseased introspection rather than a healthy cultivation of insight. Only men with cultivated insight could, according to Carlyle, recognize a hero and participate in hero-worship.

On the other hand, Carlyle's theory of education,


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or more properly, his philosophy of culture, constitutes the basis of his criticism of democracy. In contrast to the democratic method, Abbot Samson, for example, is elected, not by all the members of St. Edmundsbury, but, by thirteen elder monks; only these men, "sworn to obedience, ... /knowing/ what it is they are obeying," choose a leader. Those choosing have, in Carlyle's opinion, the most cultivated insight; the spiritually "select" choose their "theocrat". In contrast, and with a sardonic humor typical in Past and Present, Carlyle asks:


You Bobus Higgins, Sausage-maker on a grand scale, who are raising such a clamour for this Aristoc-racy of Talent, what is it that you do, in that big heart of yours, chiefly in very fact pay reverence to? Is it to talent, intrinsic manly worth of any kind, ... is it the bare Bobus stript of his very name and shirt, and turned loose upon society, that you admire and thank heaven for; or Bobus with his cash-accounts and larders dropping fatness, with his respectabilites, warm garnitures, and pony-chaise, admirable in some measure to certain of the flunky species? ... Like people like king. ... What can the incorruptiblest Bobuses elect, if it not be some Bobissimus, should they find such? 54

To Carlyle, therefore, the solution to man's dissatisfaction with society depends on correcting the democratic
method of producing and choosing heroes.

While Carlyle's philosophy of culture and the related theory of hero-worship seems at first to be essentially opposed to democracy, actually Carlyle's pol-



itical theory and democratic theory have much in common. For example, the unconscious, as he describes it, is the mental faculty for perceiving ultimate reality beyond mere appearance; from the unconscious comes the instinctive recognition of heroes by hero-worshipers. However, the hero-worshiper, or the "ordinary man", lacks the talents enabling him to lead others into deeper insight and beneficial action. Nevertheless, Carlyle's hero is the democratic representative in at least the one sense that "the exact worth and worthlessness [of a people] is given [in] the men a people choose." The hero is a perfect representative only insofar as his power comes from the numbers who assent to his rule. As R.W. Emerson notes in his essay on "Plato; or, the Philosopher," the hero, as representative, is "a great average man; one who, to the best thinking, adds a proportion and equality in his faculties, so that men see in him their own dreams and glimpses made available and made to pass for what they The Carlylian hero, therefore, is democratic insofar as he represents the ideals of the majority, but decidedly non-democratic in demanding unquestioning obedience to his authority. In the early years, however, Carlyle was concerned to show the close relationship of true authority to justice, assuming, as he did, that justice is fundamental in the nature of things. Later



the emphasis shifts from the reality of justice to the necessity of power.


III

By 1867, Carlyle's hatred of the English political democracy reaches a peak; he sees Disraeli's Reform

Bill of 1867 as another inevitante advance of democracy with little concern for the consequences of such unprecedented reform. Despondently, Carlyle states in his essay "Shooting Niagara: and After" (1867):

Three things seem to be agreed upon . . . and are now in visible course of fulfillment. 1; Democracy to complete itself; to go the full length of its course, towards the Bottomless . . . 2; all Churches and so-called religions . . . shall have deliquesced, --into "Liberty of Conscience," 3; there shall be . . unlimited Free Trade . . . in the career of the Cheap and Nasty; --this beautiful career, not in shop-goods only, but in all things temporal, spiritual and eternal. 57

At the time of his essay "Shooting Niagara", the long struggle towards an "heroic" civilization had, in Carlyle's views, not even begun. Inadequate educational facilities, only slightly improved working and living conditions,



plus the unprecedented extension of the franchise into the uneducated wage earning class, all combine to create, what was to Carlyle, a terrifying situation. Like many modern conservatives, like Burke, for example, Carlyle fears the rising power of the working class. The workers now have the power to revenge the years of ruthless industrial exploitation. This possibility of revenge, heightened by previous violent outbursts like the Chartist movement (1837-1848), and the mass meetings at Trafalgar Square and Hyde Park in 1866, reminds Carlyle of the chaos and terror of the French Revolution. Whereas he had recognized the inevitability of the French Revolution, since the French had departed from the sustaining power of justice, his fear now drives him to extremely conservative views. As a result, in "Shooting Niagara", Carlyle's former concern for the dignity of the ordinary man degenerates into contemptuous referring to the populace as: "Swarmery. 'Sons of the Devil'. in overwhelming majority, ____ [those exhibiting] blockheadism, gullibility, bribeability, amenability to beer and balderdash."


Also, in his views on the celebrated Governor Eyre Case, his conservativism becomes savage and tyrannical.

After becoming indoctrinated in Carlyle's belief that

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forceful measures must be taken in what Carlyle called "The Nigger Question." the matter of negro discontent in the British Colonies. Governor Eyre declared a month of marshal law in Jamaica and promoted revengeful slaughter of the natives after a group of natives demonstrated violently against an unpopular magistrate, killing eighteen (mostly whites). At Eyre's instruction a "total of 586 natives had been killed or executed, about 600 (including women) had been flogged and over 1,000 houses An initial wave of resentment had been destroyed." in England, against Eyre, was led by J.S. Mill; Eyre was recalled and his pension revoked. Mill sought prosecution of Eyre, but Carlyle and his conservative followers -- among them, at least temporarily, were Dickens, Ruskin, Kingsley, Tennyson, and Froude -- prevented prosecution of Eyre and eventually had Eyre's pension restored, hailing him as the savior of the West Indies.

The seeds of Carlyle's later extremely conservative views abound, however, in his earlier writings. Carlyle agrees to the use of force to maintain what before "Niagara", may still claim to be reasonable authority. Abbot Samson, for example, in Past and Present, excommunicates disobedient and lazy monks, "roysterous sons of nobles," and quarreling townsfolk to restore order and productive work. Similarly in Heroes and Hero-worship,




Carlyle exonerates Cromwell of charges of tyrannically usurping parliamentary power, for Cromwell dissolves the puritan's parliament only after debate on methods of governing England, Scotland, and Ireland result in 63.

"no answer; nothing but talk, talk."

Carlyle's early position allowing legitimate force to be exercised by heroes in accord with the creative urges of their unconscious powers, descends in the later works to extreme and perverted use of raw power to preserve the status quo. Fear of civilization oppressing man's irrationality and creativity becomes fear that the latent destruction in irrationality will annihilate civilization. After becoming contemptuous of the common people whom he formerly had hopes of cultivating, he attains an extreme position in which he praises tyrannical suppression of rebelliousness: "The Almighty Maker has appointed /the 'Nigger' -- Carlyle's term/ to be a servant." Here, surely, Carlyle reaches the depths of his plunge from constructive criticism of the ills of modern civilázation to an actual spreading of the disease. As Raymond Williams points out in Culture and Society:

The limitation, as /Carlyle's/ life's work continued, is to be seen, primarily, in a false construction of basic issues of relationship. In this he is a victim of the situation which, in "Signs of the Times", he had described. 'This veneration for the physically Strongest has spread itself through Literature. ... In all senses, we



worship and follow after Power': these are the marks of the sickness which Carlyle observed, and to which he himself succumbed. 65

Carlyle's optimistic belief in the benevolence of man, derived largely from conservative German Romanticism, becomes clouded by his fundamental Calvinistic view of man as a fallen being. "Evil", says Carlyle in "Characteristics", "what we call Evil, must ever exist while man exists: Evil, in the widest sense we can give it, is precisely the dark, disordered material out of which man's Free-will has to create an edifice of order and of Good. Ever must pain purge us to Labour; and only in free Effort can any Blessedness be imagined for us."

As he ages and becomes more authoritarian, the evil which had seemed tolerable as the raw material for fashioning good becomes more formidable and oppressive to him, and he therefore becomes more repressive in response.

Carlyle's later extreme views, however, should not, by any means, eclipse his earlier brilliant positive criticism of civilization, his penetrating insight into common assumptions and attitudes, and his courageous and sincere articulation of his beliefs. Carlyle always had a stern, puritanical disposition, enjoyed emphasizing his views with hyperboles, and, like all inspired teachers, presented his teachings enthusiastically. Nevertheless, his penetrating criticism of modern civilization

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must not be obscured: the negative diagnosis of modern man's morbid self-analysis, boredom with mechanical toil, lust for power, imbalanced development of human faculties, and all the other symptoms of disease in industrial civilization, must remain exposed.



Chapter III

Faith in machinery is, I said, our besetting danger; often in machinery most absurdly disproportioned to the end which this machinery, if it is to do any good at all, is to serve; but always in machinery, as if it had a value in and for itself.

This condemnation of modern civilization, from Matthew Arnold's persuasive essay in political and social criticism, Culture and Anarchy, reveals his fear of the primary motivations of industrial society. As a liberal in the last half of the nineteenth century, Arnold's criticism of industrialized civilization resembles in part the social criticism of conservative thinkers, like Burke and Carlyle, in the first half of the century. Arnold attempts to temper and balance the exaggerated emphasis on commercialism and individualism of the liberal utilitarian Victorian's by, as we will see later, drawing on the conservative cultural tradition of Burke and Carlyle, and the German "romantic" conservatives led by Goethe.

In <u>Culture and Anarchy</u>, (1869) Arnold stresses
the Victorian's need for cultivating an inward attitude,
a state of mind, or, as J.H. Newman, Arnold's contemporary, says in his essay <u>On the Scope and Nature of</u>
<u>University Education</u> (1852), a "philosophical habit,

. . . a personal possession, and an inward endowment":

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The idea of perfection as an inward condition of the mind and spirit is at variance with the mechanical and material civilization in esteem with us, and nowhere, as I have said, so much in esteem as with us. The idea of perfection as a general expansion of the human family is at variance with our strong individualism, our hatred of all limits to the unrestrained swing of the individual's personality, our maxim of "every man for himself."

Arnold proposes cultivation of this "inward attitude"

within the existing framework of traditions and insti
tutions in civilization; he does not, like the Benthamites,

still less like the revolutionaries Marx and Morris,

propose destruction of existing social institutions

and the creation of new. Arnold realizes the worth

of traditions, customs, and inherited institutions.

"Violent indignation with the past, abstract systems

of renovation applied wholesale, a new doctrine drawn

up in black and white for elaborating down to the very

smallest details a rational society for the future,

--these," argues Arnold, echoing Burke's condemnation

of the French revolutionists, and himself condemning the

radical English liberals, "these are the ways of Jacob
inism."


Arnold's repeated use of Bishop Wilson's maxims,
"Inever go against the best light you have; . . . [and]
take care that your light not be darkness,!" implies
Arnold's belief in man's need for a culture based on
tradition; it also contains his belief that culture is

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a process. Arnold turns "a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits" when he loose-

ly defines the "best light" as "the best which has been thought and said in the world." Arnold's purpose here is clearly similar to Coleridge's in The Constitution of Church and State. Like Arnold, Coleridge seeks to curb the divisive effects of intellectual liberalism by harmonizing its findings with the achievements of the past. Coleridge perceives the "national Church /to be/ the third great venerable estate of the realm." supporting and balancing the estate of national "permanency" (landowners) and the estate of national "progressiveness" (professionals, merchants, and the men of the distributive class), while, at the same time, advancing the cultivation and civilization of the community. national Church attempts "to preserve the stores and to guard the treasures of past civilization, and thus to bind the present with the past; to perfect and add to the same, and thus to connect the present with the future."

This notion of culture being at once conservative and progressive prevails throughout the writings of Burke, Coleridge and Arnold. Culture, when considered as a process, contains the idea of progress: "light and perfection consist, not in resting and being, but in growing and becoming, in a perpetual advance of beauty and



Arnold's liberalism and belief in human progress, however, balance with his conservative beliefs when he states that if the English "are still to live and grow, and this famous nation is not to stagnate and dwindle away on one hand, or, on the other, to perish miserably in mere anarchy and confusion, ... [there must be/ a revolution ... by due course of law." view follows Burke's emphasis on the cultural tradition embodied in the English Constitution. In his Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke says: "All the reformations we /English/ have hitherto made have proceeded upon the principle of reverence to antiquity; and I hope, nay I am persuaded, that all those which possibly may be made hereafter, will be carefully formed upon analogical precedent, authority, and example." ly sense of the nation's accumulated wisdom, embodying the experience of past generations, becomes for Burke, Coleridge, and Arnold a power for social cohesion deserving the greatest respect both for its political and psychological benefits.

Accompanying his emphasis on a harmonious and unified traditional culture is Arnold's plea for a diversified and balanced development of the individual's total
potentiality for perfection. Burke notes that inherited

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unity in so great a diversity of its parts." Simi-larly, Coleridge, in The Constitution of Church and State, sees the constitution as ideally a tested system of checks and balances, allowing expression to both progressive and conservative forces in society, and establishing peaceful conditions conducive to harmonious development and enrichment of the individual's potentialities.

Coleridge's ideal of a harmonious and progressive culture comes at the beginning of what John Stuart Mill. in his essay on Coleridge, commends as a new philosophical theory of civilization, "the Germano -- Coleridgean ... philosophy of human culture." Although, as we have seen, this ideal is to a great extent native as well, particularly in Burke; Arnold, like Carlyle, was well read in German literature and shows the influence of its concern about the ways in which modern man is becoming fragmented. Schiller especially, in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, (1793), addresses himself to Arnold's major concerns. Like Burke, he is reacting to the rampant rationalism of the French revolutionary theorists; like Carlyle, he detects a hostility between intellect and imagination, reason and instinct; like Marx and Ruskin, he sees modern man being fragmented by division of labour, or as he puts it "differentiation

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
of function." Like Arnold, Schiller is concerned to retain some harmony and integration in man's faculties. Moreover, his analysis of social classes resembles

Arnold's in some respects, even to labelling the aristocracy as "Barbarians". Schiller's view of culture can be seen from the following passage from the Letters:

The exercises from the gymnasium form athletic bodies; but beauty is only developed by free and equal play of the limbs. In the same way the tension of the isolated spiritual forces may make extraordinary men; but it is only the well-tempered equilibrium of these forces that can produce happy and accomplished men. 14

Arnold's concern, then, is one that is widespread, and he draws on many sources.


Expanding on the notion of the need for a balanced development of man's total potentiality for perfection, Arnold contrasts what he considers to be the predominating characteristics and deficiencies of the English, with the characteristics and deficiencies of modern France and then compares both with the ideal of cultivated harmony that he finds in Periclean Athens. In both England and France the imbalance comes between morality and intellect. In a letter to his sister, Arnold notes, after meeting Renan in 1859, the existence of a considerable resemblance between the literary and educational endeavors of Renan and himself:



Renan tends to inculcate morality, in a high sense of the word, upon the French nation as what they most want, while I tend to inculcate intelligence, also in a high sense of the word, upon the English nation as what they most want. 15


Again, Arnold condemns the English for having an exaggerated concern for morality (Hebraism) at the expense of
the balancing concern for intelligence and beauty (Hellenism): "Obviously, with us," says Arnold in <u>Culture</u>
and <u>Anarchy</u>, "it is usually Hellenism which is thus relenism to the triumph of Hebraism." He
proposes balancing and complementing the Hebraic ideal
of perfection with the Greek ideal; he does not propose
eliminating one side of man's nature in favor of another.

In the chapter "Hebraism and Hellenism", Arnold contrasts the respective attributes of Hebraism and Hellenism: Hebraic strictness of conscience contrasts with Hellenic spontaneity of conscience, energy and action with feeling and thinking, the sense of sin with the sense of beauty, firm obedience with clear intelligence. To Arnold "both Hellenism and Hebraism are profound and admirable manifestations of man's life, tendencies, and powers, and ... both of them aim at a 17 like final result," --human perfection. This perfection is best achieved by balancing and combining both invaluable contributions to human development. Arnold believes also, that in determining what constitutes the



ideal of human perfection, religion and culture have a mutual goal, but culture moves "through all the voices of human experience, ... of art, science, poetry, philosophy, history, as well as of religion." Going beyond the usually accepted function of religion, culture "is a harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature, and is not consistent with the over-development of any one power at 19 the expense of the rest."

However, Arnold contradicts his doctrine of the cultivation of total diversity of man's capacity for perfection; he distinguishes between man's "higher" and "animal" selves. "Religion says: The Kingdom of God is within you; and culture, in like manner, places human perfection in an internal condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished Again, in speaking of "the obfrom our animality." vious faults of our animality." Arnold excludes part of the instincts from the area of human experience worthy of being perfected. Such a statement possibly suggests a particular disapproval of man's pride and selfishness, as well as man's purely biological instincts. In suppressing part of man's instinctive nature, Arnold reaches a position that is vulnerable to being labelled "Victorian" -- in the pejorative sense, implying fastid-




iousness and prudish views regarding conduct. Such a meaning, however, stems from the puritanical teachings of Evangelicalism and sectarianism, whose views Arnold sees as "'dismal and illiberal,'" resulting in a "'hole-and-corner' existence with an entirely provincial out
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look." However, even in suppressing a part of man's capacity for experience, Arnold is motivated by a desire to promote an "endless growth in wisdom and beauty,

... /in which/ the spirit of the human race finds its

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ideal."


When applying his theory of Hebraic and Hellenistic "cultural tradition" to history, however, Arnold sees the Hebraic emphasis in nineteenth-century English society as a force generally out of harmony with the main tradition of Hellenic thought. In post-medieval western civilization Arnold sees Hellenism as a dominating resurging stream of thought. "The Renascence," says Arnold, "that great re-awakening of Hellenism, that irresistible return of humanity to nature and to seeing things as they are, --- had, like the anterior Hellenism of the Pagan world, a side of moral weakness, and of relaxation or insensibility of the moral fiber," causing a reaction whereby the English Reformation becomes "a Hebraising revival, a return to the ardour and sincereness of primitive Christianity." The seventeenth-century English



Puritans "have made the secondary the principal at the wrong moment," says Arnold, "and the principal they have at the wrong moment treated as secondary."

Arnold feels that the inappropriate emphasis on Hebraism makes the English provincial and insular and decidedly opposed to what he calls "modernism". In his essay "On the Modern Element in Literature", Arnold suggests that "modernism", like culture, is an attitude of the mind, the spirit of "intellectual deliverance" consisting of man's comprehension of the past and present as a "harmonious acquiescence of mind which we feel in contemplating a grand spectacle that is intelligible to Exemplifying Arnold's meaning of the "modern habit of mind" is the Greek historian, Thucydides, whose intellectual maturity and critical but tolerant spirit enables him to understand and convey to others truths of universal human significance that underlie the multitudinous factual data of man's past and present experiences. Arnold explains the distinguishing marks of both "modern" writers and modern eras:

On the one hand, the presence of a significant spectacle to contemplate; on the other hand, the desire to find the true point of view from which to contemplate this spectacle. He who has found that point of view, he who adequately comprehends this spectacle, has risen to the comprehension of his age: he who communicates that point of view to his age, he who interprets to it that spectacle, is one of his age's intellectual deliverers. 27




Against the age of Periclean Athens, and its age's intellectual deliverers, Thucydides and Sophocles, Arnold
contrasts nineteenth-century Europe and its age's intellectual deliverers. In his "Preface to Poems" (1853),
Arnold argues:

A host of voices will indignantly rejoin that the present age is inferior to the past neither in moral grandeur nor in spiritual health. He who possesses the discipline I speak of will content himself with remembering the judgements passed upon the present age, in this respect, by the two men, the one of strongest head, the other of widest culture, whom it has produced; by Goethe and by Niebuhr. I say, that in the sincere endeavour to learn and practise, amid the bewildering confusion of our times, what is sound and true in poetical art, I seemed to myself to find the only sure guidance, the only solid footing, among the ancients. They, at any rate, knew what they wanted in art, and we do not. 28

Again, in his article on "Heinrich Heine", Arnold sees Goethe as interpreting and communicating the main current of German activity and literature, and Heine as inheriting and continuing this same current of "modern" thought. Believing that English literature is not even a part of the modern tradition marked by Goethe and Heine, Arnold, though recognizing Heine's shortcomings, sympathizes with Heine, who in 1830 was "in no humour for any such gradual process of liberation from the older order of things as that which Goethe had followed. His [Heine's] counsel was for open war." Heine's fight was not prim-

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arily with the aristocracy's imperviousness to new ideas; but rather, his "was a life and death battle with Philistinism, with the strong, dogged, unenlightened opponent of the chosen people, of the children of the 30
light." A similar battle was waged by Arnold against the fanatical individualism and exclusive commercial motivation of the early Victorian English liberals. Arnold believed that the English unhappily had no Goethe to initially awaken them to a new, ascending order of thought; rather, Wordsworth, Scott, and Keats produced works that, no matter how artistically superior to those works of Byron and Shelley, "do not belong to that which is the main current of the literature of the modern epochs, they do not apply modern ideas to life; they constitute, therefore, minor currents, and all other literary work of our day, however popular, which has the same defect, also constitutes but a minor current." Heine's "intense modernism", on the other hand, brings "all things under the point of view of the nineteenth-century, [where they] were understood and laid to heart by Germany, through virtue of immense, tolerant intellectualism, much as there was in all Heine said to affront and wound Germany. Upon viewing the English intellectual scene, however, Arnold blames the insularity of the aristocracy and the stupifying narrowness of interests among the "Philistine"




liberals for the fact that "Byron and Shelley did not succeed in their attempt freely to apply the modern spirit in English literature; they could not succeed in it; the resistance to baffle them, the want of intelligent sympathy to guide and uphold them, were too great."

Again in his essay on "Pagan and Medieval Religious Sentiment", Arnold sees Heine as continuing the fight against the old "moral and spiritual" structure of repressive Christian civilization, offering as an alternative the "carnal and pagan" sentiments of Greek civilization; in fact, Heine "divided the whole world into the "barbarians and Greeks." Heine, professing a Greek "religion of pleasure" states:

Some day or other, when humanity shall have got quite well again, when the body and soul shall have made their peace together, the factitious quarrel which Christianity has cooked up between them will appear something hardly comprehensible. The fairer and happier generations, offspring of unfettered unions, that will rise up and bloom in the atmosphere of a religion of pleasure, will smile sadly when they think of their poor ancestors, whose life was passed in melancholy abstinence from the joys of this beautiful earth. ... I am a believer in progress, and I hold God to be a kind being who has intended man to be happy. 35

Arnold agrees with Heine's rapturous advocacy of the religion of pleasure insofar as Heine diverts the secondary current of Hebraic Reformation thought into the primary current of Hellenic Renaissance thought. But, although Arnold admits that "the religion of pleasure' has much



that is natural in it; humanity will gladly accept it if it can live by it," he believes that only "one man in many millions, a Heine, may console himself, and keep himself erect in suffering, ... but the many millions cannot, ... [whereas] the sentiment of a religion of sorrow, ... [has the] power to be a general, popular, religious sentiment, a stay for the mass of mankind, whose lives are full of hardship."

Arnold holds a less optimistic but perhaps a more realistic opinion of man's capacity for accepting the inevitable suffering in life, than does Heine. Arnold, in accepting the existence of evil and the sense of sin, suggests a more realistic alternative, a balance between the extremes of the Greek religion of pleasure and the Hebraic religion of sorrow. Arnold notes in Culture and Anarchy:

Nothing is more striking than to observe in how many ways a limited conception of human nature, the notion of a one thing needful, a one side in us to be made uppermost, the disregard of a full and harmonious development of ourselves tells injuriously on our thinking and acting.

Accepting both the inherent evil of human nature and, as well, the possibility of man's perfectibility, Arnold possesses a mental balance that pervades his prose writings; this balance, however, is lacking in his poet-ry. His poetry, although frequently dealing with classical Greek subjects, reflects the pessimism, morbidity,

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and despair pervading modern thought. Says Arnold in his "Preface to Poems" (1853):

What those who are familiar only with the great monuments of early Greek genius suppose to be its exclusive characteristics, have disappeared; the calm, the cheerfulness, the disinterested objectivity have disappeared; the dialogue of the mind with itself has commenced; modern problems have presented themselves; we hear already the doubts, we witness the discouragement, of Hamlet and of Faust. 38

The prevalent despair in his poetry is typified in the famous passage from Dover Beach (1867):

Ah, love, let us be true
To one another; for the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.39

Also, Arnold's own desire to escape into a world free of morbid self-analysis and frenzied commercial activity is depicted in his poem The Scholar Gipsy (1853). This poem tells of a legendary seventeenth-century Oxford student who left his studies to join a band of wandering gipsies to learn their traditions, wisdom, and secret powers of the imagination. After romantically reflecting on the Scholar Gipsy's simple nomadic life in a beautiful pastoral world, Arnold sees his own life in contrast:

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O born in days when wits were fresh and clear,
And life ran gaily on as the sparkling Thames;
Before this strange disease of modern life,
With its sick hurry, its divided aims,
Its heads o'ertax'd, its palsied hearts, was rife-Fly hence, our contact fear!41

Again, in Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse (1867),
Arnold envies the medieval monks for their secure faith,
their freedom from modern scepticism, but also sees their
peace as that of the desert. Realizing the irreversibility of scientific knowledge that ultimately makes
man an insignificant part of a vast mechanical universe,
yet still longing to return to the unified faith of medieval society, Arnold sees himself as a typical Victorian man:

Wandering between two worlds, one dead,
The other powerless to be born,
With nowhere yet to rest my head,
Like these, on earth I wait forlorn.
Their faith, my tears, the world deride—
I come to shed them at their side. 42

In his poem Resignation (1849), Arnold finds some satisfaction in his life as a poet:

And though fate grudge to thee and me The poet's rapt security, Yet they, believe me, who await No gifts from chance, have conquer'd fate. 43

For most modern men, however, Arnold the poet can only prescribe stoical resignation to a seemingly meaningless existence, and he finally admits that resignation and immersion in worldly activity are both unsatisfactory:

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Enough, we live! -- and if a life,
With large results so little rife,
Though bearable, seem hardly worth
This pomp of worlds, this pain of birth;
Not milder is the general lot
Because our spirits have forgot,
In action's dizzying eddy whirl'd,
The something that infects the world.

The following passage from A Summer Night (1852), sums up his despair of finding meaning, hope, and joy in modern life:

For most men in a brazen prison live,
Where, in the sun's hot eye,
With heads bent o'er their toil, they languidly
Their lives to some unmeaning taskwork give,
Dreaming of naught beyond their prison wall.
And as, year after year,
Fresh products of their barren labour fall.
From their tired hands, and rest
Never yet comes more near,
Gloom settles slowly down over their breast;
And while they try to stem
The waves of mournful thought by which they are prest,
Death in their prison reaches them,
Unfreed, having seen nothing, still unblest.

After realizing that, as a poet, he is incapable of inspiring and rejoicing his readers, Arnold ceases writing verse. As Kenneth Allot says: "Arnold's poetic vocation was to express disenchantment--when he fully realized that, he chose silence."

Arnold's negative criticism of his society and its spirit does not, however, pervade his prose; in fact, his prose criticism of civilization is generally optimistic. For example, he suggests, the authority of the


P state to be a positive solution to the social and spiritual problems of Victorian civilization. Arnold's emphasis on state authority, however, creates a contradiction in his thinking: the cultural tradition, emphasizing diversity and balance in human development, becomes,
as we will see in <u>Culture and Anarchy</u>, a self-preserving
tyranny when dealing with rebelliousness. For Arnold,
the state is somehow less vulnerable to immorality than
is the individual. Arnold notes:

Providence, as the moralists are careful to tell us, generally works in human affairs by human means; so when we want to make right reason act on individual inclination, our best self on our ordinary self, we seek to give it more power of doing so by giving it public recognition and authority, and embodying it, so far as we can, in the State.

Once again he echoes Burke, when he states that morality and right reason are best entrusted to the nation or state rather than the individual:

We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages.

The State propagates the cultural tradition of the nation's inherited right reason by uniting individuals into a community, an abstract but organic whole, wherein each individual member incurs duties as well as gains enrichments from society. Both Arnold and Burke, however, fail to acknowledge the danger of the State's self-interest



predominating over its altruistic motives.


Arnold's desire to develop right reason in the individual provides a problem when put into practice. Believing in the vital necessity of cultivating the individual's reason, and desiring sure transmission of cultural benefits and responsibilities to the members from the State, Arnold in his essay "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time", advocates the use of force:

Force till right is ready; and till right is ready, force, the existing order of things, is justified, is the legitimate ruler. But right is something moral, and implies inward recognition, free assent of the will; ... /because/ for other people enamoured of their own newly discerned right, to attempt to impose it upon us as ours, and violently to substitute their right for our force, is an act of tyranny, and to be resisted. ... This /imposition of abstract right/ was the ground error of the French Revolution. 49

He reasons that without order there can be no society and without society there can be no human perfection.


For Arnold, the "State" instills man with reason, beliefs, rights; in fact, his very humanity and its perfection.

Arnold's belief in the use of force to expand and enrich human faculties stems from his optimistic belief in the capacity of "right reason" to advance man towards an ultimate goal of perfection: "'Make reason and the will of God prevail'" says Arnold, quoting Bishop Wilson, and recognize that right reason is discovered in the best of what has been thought and written in the world. This "reason", however, is best interpreted and prop-




agated by the State's institutions and traditions rather than by individuals. Individuals cannot even completely understand the literary part of "the best which has been thought and said in the world," for literature, says Arnold in "Literature and Science", is "all knowledge that reaches us through books."51 Individuals see only a fragment of this guiding culture and, therefore, constantly tend to diverge from right reason, and endanger it. Right reason becomes the absolute standard by which institutions and individuals alike are judged. When the culture of right reason is embodied in the State, the State becomes a religion or myth, justifying conduct by precedent, connecting past and present with God, uniting the members under one community: "The State", says Arnold "is the religion of all its citizens without the fanaticism of any of them."52 Since culture leads towards fulfillment of man's capacity for righteousness, any heresy against the State must be dealt with severely. This way reason remains pure, strong, and beyond corruption. That the State consists of corruptible, and often incapable individuals, Arnold fails to acknowledge.

Another "liberal", John Stuart Mill, believes as firmly in reason as does Arnold. As Lionel Trilling points out in his comparison of the two men in Chapter Nine of Matthew Arnold, Mill, on the one hand, wishes



to protect reason by allowing the fullest possible freedom for the individual, the greatest number of conflicting opinions, by demanding the individual's use of reason or choosing, and thereby placing the burden of discovery and preserving truth on the individual; Arnold, on the other hand, places the burden on the State. ferences show the opposing views held by Mill and Arnold on the nature of society and of truth. Mill. on one hand sees society as an aggregate of individuals or atoms. with each atom foregoing certain privileges to organized society in return for certain benefits. Mill, in describing Bentham's view of society, describes what is basically his own view: "Bentham's idea of the world is that of a collection of persons pursuing each his separate interest or pleasure, and the prevention of whom from jostling one another more than is unavoidable, may be attempted by hopes and fears derived from three sources -- the law, religion, and public opinion." Mill. truth has no basis in an absolute; rather, he has. as Lionel Trilling points out, "a lively and salutary sense of the opinionative nature of truth and of the dependence of opinion on class, on national culture and on time." Mill, arguing for maximum diversity of opinion says in On Liberty: "However true [an opinion] may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly dis-



cussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living 56 truth."

Arnold, on the other hand, like Burke, sees society as an organic whole of which each individual is but a branch, deriving life-blood from the main trunk of society's institutions that are rooted in tradition. However, he sees truth as beyond both individuals and institutions; to him truth looks ultimately to a mystical sanction. In his essay, "Democracy", Arnold states: "Human thought, which made all institutions, inevitably saps them, resting only in that which is absolute and eternal." Arnold, culture perceives and manifests this "absolute and eternal": the Divine Reason unravels itself in man's culture and in the events of human history, just as for Hegel "the True is the whole, a totality which is never reached finally, but which keeps driving through on in an endless process, ... [and] the dialectic of history manifests the development of universal mind through the forms of particular states." "Culture", says Arnold, "directs our attention to the natural current there is in human affairs, and to its continual working, and will not let us rivet our faith upon any one man and his doings. It makes us see, not only his good side, but also how much in him was of necessity limited and transient; nay, it even feels a pleasure, a sense of increased free-

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dom and of an ampler future in so doing."

Both Mill and Arnold recognize the supreme imporance of reason in spite of radically opposite methods they would employ to ensure the maximum use and protection of reason. However, just as Arnold appears "characteristically Victorian" in his apotheosis of reason, so too is Carlyle "characteristically Victorian" in his apotheosis of instinct. Although this seems paradoxical, Arnold and Mill must certainly be deemed as "characteristic" as Carlyle and Butler. The issue of reason versus instinct was being examined and contested. As Mill says in his essay on "The Subjection of Women" (1869):

It is one of the characteristic prejudices of the reaction of the nineteenth-century against the eighteenth, to accord to the unreasoning elements in human nature the infallibility which the eight-eenth-century is supposed to have ascribed to the reasoning elements. For the apotheosis of Reason we have substituted that of Instinct; and we call everything instinct which we find in ourselves and for which we cannot trace any rational foundation.

Mill, on the whole, was correct in seeing "the apotheosis of Instinct" as a fundamental nineteenth-century endeaveour, though even he probably underestimated its growing appeal.

To sum up: Like Carlyle's, Arnold's vision of man's faculties and civilization is conditioned by the French Revolution, by criticisms of what it signifies (as in

F 77 • 17 Burke and Schiller), and by the divisive nature of contemporary individualism. Although like Burke, Coleridge, Schiller, and Carlyle, Arnold seeks to retain harmony in the individual personality as well as in civilization. he ultimately draws a dividing line himself. He splits man's intellectual and animal natures in the traditional stoic manner, after the fashion of Swift's Houyhnhnm-Yahoo division. Whereas Carlyle's moral concern makes him sacrifice totality for duty, Arnold's concern for intellect makes him champion the use of force to make reason dominant. Carlyle, however, presents his concern in a violent and bombastic style that contrasts markedly with Arnold's cultivated urbanity; a difference due in part at least to their very different background and sensibility. Each at least starts, however, with the same major concern: the harmonious development of man's diverse potentialities in a civilization that threatens to split and narrow him. Arnold summarizes this concern in the following passage from his essay on "Literature. and Science":


When we set ourselves to enumerate the powers which go to the building up of human life, and say that they are the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of beauty, and the power of social life and manners,——/the men of science/can hardly deny that this scheme, ... gives a fairly true representation of the matter. ... But perhaps they may not have sufficiently observed another thing: namely, that the several powers just

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mentioned are not isolated, but there is, in the generality of mankind, a perpetual tendency to relate them to one another in divers ways.

[Also], there arises the desire to relate these pieces of knowledge [acquired in following our instinct for intellect and knowledge] to our sense for conduct, to our sense for beauty,—and there is wear—iness and dissatisfaction if the desire is baulked.

In this concern for diversity, for totality, for balance in the development of man's faculties, lies the major concern and criticism of modern civilization not only for Carlyle and Arnold but for most of the writers and social critics of the nineteenth century.




Chapter IV

The enactment of the Second Reform Bill of 1867. extending the franchise to men of all classes, including for the first time men of the working classes, created an unprecedented situation in English politics. Enfranchisement of the lower classes stimulated both Carlyle and Arnold to present their position on the culture of democracy, and to redefine, both for themselves and for the nineteenth-century, the meaning of such terms as "liberty", "freedom", and "equality". Upon comparing the positions of Carlyle and Arnold, we see that Carlyle, in "Shooting Niagara" (1867), expresses an immediate reaction to universal male sufferage; he expresses his gripping fear that democracy will introduce vulgarity and chaos into British life. Arnold, on the other hand, equally concerned over the stability and wisdom of a government catering to the demands of the new bloc of uneducated voters, could, in spite of his concern for the growing insularity of popular middle-class thinking, envisage a liberation from the old order of society through a revolution by "the due process of the law."

In his essay on "Democracy" (1861), Arnold acknowl-edges that:

The circumstances and conditions of government having changed, the guiding maxims of government



ought to change also. ... This movement of democracy ... merits properly neither blame nor praise. Its partisans are apt to give it credit which it does not deserve, while its enemies are apt to upbraid it unjustly. Its friends celebrate it as the author of all freedom. But political freedom may very well be established by aristocratic founders. ... Social freedom, --equality, --that is rather the field of the conquests of democracy. And here what I must call the injustice of its enemies comes in.

This controlled and penetrating criticism of democracy is in marked contrast to Carlyle's, who, coming fresh from his impassioned and successful defence of Governor Eyre, views English democracy and England's Colonial policy with a fear that approaches hysteria. In a typical passage in "Shooting Niagara" (1867) he comments:

And the state your regulations have Dominica, and other colonial islands/ in, at present, is: Population of a 100 white men (by no means of select type): unknown cipher of rattlesnakes, profligate Niggers and Mulattoes; governed by a Piebald Parliament of Eleven (head Demosthenes there a Nigger Tinman) .-- and so exquisite a care of Being and Well-being that the old Fortifications have become jungle-quarries (Tinman "at liberty to tax himself"), vigorous roots penetrating the old ashlar, dislocating it everywhere, with tropical effect; old cannon going quietly to honeycomb and oxide of iron, in the vigorous embrace of jungle: military force nil, police force next to nil: an Island capable of being taken by a crew of a man-of-war's boat. And indeed it was nearly lost, the other year, by an accidental collision of two Niggers to see .-who would not go away again, but idly re-assembled with increased numbers on the morrow, and with ditto the next day; assemblage pointing ad infinitum seemingly, -- had not some charitable small French Governor, from his bit of Island within reach, sent over a Lieutenant and twenty soldiers, to extinguish the devouring absurdity, and order it home straightway to its bed. Which instantly saved this valuable

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Possession of ours, and left our Demosthenic Tinman and his Ten, with their liberty to tax themselves as heretofor. Is not "Self-government" a sublime thing, in Colonial Islands and some others?

Carlyle's brutal criticism of democracy is less precise and informative than Arnold's comments on the dangers confronting the individual in a democratic society.

In "Democracy" Arnold notes:

The difficulty for democracy is, how to find and keep high ideals. The individuals who compose it are, the bulk of them, persons who need to follow an ideal, not to set one; and one ideal of greateness, high feeling, and fine culture, which an aristocracy once supplied to them, they lose by the very fact of ceasing to be a lower order and becoming a democracy.

Sympathizing with Carlyle's fear of the effects of giving a voice to those whose notion of freedom is largely negative, an escape from authority, duty, and self-control, Arnold goes on to analyse the attitude towards freedom in the wake of the extension of democracy.

In <u>Culture</u> and <u>Anarchy</u> (1869), Arnold notes the effect of "the anarchial tendency of our worship of freedom in and for itself":

More and more, because of this our blind faith in machinery, ... /Englishmen/ are beginning to assert and put in practice an Englishman's right to do what he likes; his right to march where he likes, meet where he likes, enter where he likes, hoot as he likes, threaten as he likes, smash as he likes. All this, I say, tends to anarchy.


Although here Arnold places unfair emphasis on the extraVagances of a small minority of the English populace, he

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does point out the dominant negative notion of freedom held by "a number of excellent people, and particularly [people of] ... the Liberal or progressive party." Arnold, an even greater concern than the possibility of violent rebelliousness is the self-righteous insularity of the liberal middle-class Englishmen. Their unshakeable belief that the "light they follow is not darkness," prevents them from suspecting that a proper manner of action, and a right use of reason may exist simultaneously with a belief in freedom: the positive side of freedom is obscured by their exclusive vision of the negative side. Not only are they limited in their experience of "the best of what has been thought and said by man," but, they are proud and self-righteous about their limitations. The Puritan attitude typifies this popular middle-class English attitude for Arnold:

The Puritan's great danger is that he imagines himself in possession of a rule telling him the unum necessarium, or one thing needful, and that he then remains satisfied with a very crude conception of what his rule really is and what it tells him, thinks he has now knowledge and henceforth needs only to act, and, in this dangerous state of assurance and self-satisfaction, proceeds to give full swing to a number of the instincts of his ordinary self.

The loss of the example of the ideal, the cultivated, the "perfected humanity", once supplied by the aristocaracy, and now nowhere extant in a "levelled" democratic society, leaves only the ordinary, imperfect, mediocre



impulses to guide man's actions. "It is not so much that [men] sink to be somewhat less than themselves," says


Arnold in "Democracy", "as that they cease to be somewhat more than themselves."

To protect civilization from this injurious emphasis on individual freedom, Arnold, in his "Preface to the Second Edition" of poems (1854), suggests that:

The classical writers ... can help to cure us of what is, it seems to me, the great vice of our intellect, manifesting itself in our incredible vagaries in literature, in art, in religion, in morals: namely, that it is fantastic, and wants sanity. Sanity—that is the great virtue of the ancient literature: the want of that is the great defect of the modern, in spite of all its variety and power. It is impossible to read carefully the great ancients, without losing something of our caprice and eccentricity8

Arnold is acutely aware that this "fanatical individualism", especially prevalent among the middle-class Puritans,
"created a type of life and manners, of which they themselves indeed are slow to recognize the faults, but which
is fatally condemned by its hideousness, its immense ennui,
and against which the instinct of self-preservation in
humanity rebels." Loneliness, alienation, and despair
are distinctive marks of Arnold's poetry, increasingly
prominent marks of his century, and certainly also of
the twentieth-century.

While for Arnold the example of human perfection resides in Greek and Roman antiquity, and in the "State",



for Carlyle it resides in the properly functioning aristocracy. However, for Carlyle, in Past and Present (1843), the "Aristocracy has become Phantasm-Aristocracy, no longer able to do its work, not in the least conscious that it has any work longer to do." In his early works. he hopes that eventually the industrialists will assume the aristocracy's neglected duties of governing; but. he despairs in the capacity of the democratic system to supply edifying leadership for the common man. Again in Past and Present, he defines democracy as "despair of finding any Heroes to govern you, and contented putting-up with the want of them," and to him parliament is an institution producing "nothing but talk, talk," The dominant middle-class society holds material wealth above all ideals of beauty, morality, and intelligence, while the restricted opportunity for education prevents widespread knowledge of the examples of human perfection seen in the culture's heroes. Defining his idea of freedom and evaluating the effectiveness of democratic government, Carlyle says in "Chartism" (1839):

If freedom have any meaning it means enjoyment of this right ... of the ignorant man to be guided by the wiser, to be, gently or forcibly, held in the true course by him. ... A self-governing/democracy is, by the nature of it, a self-cancelling business; and gives in the long-run a net result of zero, ... the consumption of No-government and Laissez-faire. 13


With the absence of any positive ideal of man's per-

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fection and with the vision of society as a composite of isolated, conflicting individuals, the ideal of liberty takes on a peculiarly narrow and negative meaning: "The liberty of not being oppressed by your fellow man! is an indispensible, yet one of the most insignificant fractional parts of Human Liberty. He stresses that liberty consists not in escaping one's responsibilities, that liberty is also the individual's duty to accept his social responsibilities and work diligently at them. "The notion that a man's liberty consists in giving his vote at election-hustlings," notes Carlyle in Past and Present, "and saying, 'Behold, now I too have my twentythousandth part of a Talker in our National Palaver: will not all the gods be good to me? '-- This notion is one of the pleasantest! With the ideal of man's perfection in society degenerating into the veneration of a brutal, narrow, and undiscriminating vision of man in a world of crude commercial conflict and exploitation, and with the feeling of justification in projecting one's individual responsibilities onto abstract political and economic systems -- here Carlyle and Arnold share a common fear of democracy. For them, freedom is more than the release from the traditional medieval authorities of Church and aristocracy: more importantly, freedom consists of an individual's positive freedom to unite himself within

-• · a common community of humanity whereby work and sincere feelings of love for others come spontaneously from his totally integrated personality, giving his life a meaningfully active solidarity with other members of society. For the individual to share in the cultural community, Carlyle suggests obedience to the "heroes"; Arnold suggests individual equality of opportunity in receiving the cultural enrichments of the "State".

On this matter of the "equality of man," however, Carlyle and Arnold are hardly in complete agreement. Both would accept the obvious fact that men differ in capacities of intelligence, sensitivity, and character, and, that men are similar in that they are bound by a common humanity. For Carlyle, the fear is that the democratic cry for "equality" means the obscuring of "heroic" qualities in the few, just as for Arnold, equality. in one sense at least, means the levelling of the standards of perfection to mediocrity, to the rule of the ordinary self: both fear the lowering and narrowing of the ideal of human perfection. While Carlyle would entrust the maintenance and exercising of the cultural ideal to the hero, and sustain the inequality between the hero and the hero-worshipper, calling on force to guide anyone who doesn't feel worshipful. Arnold would stress a culture derived from the ideal presented in the




State and world literature. Carlyle sees man as being completely fulfilled, developed, and perfected by the "perennial nobleness, and even sacredness, [of] work" in spite of what in Sartor Resartus (1830) he calls man's inherent difficulty in discovering "a certain inward Talent, [and] a certain outward Environment of Fortune; [and], to each, by wisest combination of these two, a certain maximum of Capability." Through work, each has equal opportunity to develop this maximum capability. Arnold, however, sees work as "machinery": he always asks to what end it is being done. To Arnold, the social equality provided under a common culture would strengthen the bond of common humanity.

In his essay on "Equality" (1878), Arnold stresses the necessity of having a healthy civilization:

It is easy to see that our shortcomings in civilization are due to our inequality; or in other words, that the great inequality of classes and property, which came to us from the Middle Age and which we maintain because we have the religion of inequality, that this constitution of things, I say, has the natural and necessary effect, under present circumstances, of materialising our upper class, vulgarising our middle-class, and brutalising our lower class. And this is to fail in civilization.

For Arnold, man, without a culture, without a sense of equality in a community, is not completely human, not civilized. Inequality sets up insurmountable barriers between classes and between individuals, making each



individual feel isolated, insignificant, and powerless.

Since the community is the lifeblood of the individual's humanity, to be cut off from all or part of man's culture by barriers of inequality, is to be completely or partially dehumanized. As Arnold says:

Civilization is the humanization of man in society.


... And to be civilized is to make progress towards this four true and full humanity in civil society; in that civil society "without which," says Burke "man could not by any possibility arrive at the perfection of which his nature is capable, nor even make a remote and faint approach to it."19

Again, when commenting on the "Laissez-faire and utilitarian" doctrine of individual freedom, Arnold says:

So far as I can sound human consciousness, I cannot, as I have often said, perceive that man is really conscious of any abstract natural rights at all.

If it is the sound English doctrine that all rights are created by law and are based on expediency, and are alterable as the public advantage may require, certainly that orthodox doctrine is mine. Property is created and maintained by law ... and a good deal of inequality is inevitable. But that the power of disposal should be practically unlimited, that the inequality should be enormous, or that the degree of inequality admitted at one time should be admitted always, -- this is by no means so certain. 20

A sense of justice, and the moral obligation of society's lawmakers to present the best possible opportunity for the individual to pursue his perfection, underlie Arnold's meaning of equality. Indeed, since his concept of God is "that stream of tendency by which all things strive to fulfill the law of their being,




/which for man is/ the force not ourselves which makes 21 for righteousness," Arnold is profoundly concerned about social inequalities that inhibit human perfection. To offset the dangers of fragmenting society through extremes of inequality, Arnold argues:


The power of social life and manners is truly, as we have seen, one of the great elements in our humanization. Unless we have cultivated it, we are incomplete. The impulse for cultivating it is not, indeed, a moral impulse. It is by no means identical with the moral impulse to help our neighbor and to do him good. Yet in many ways it works to a like end. It brings men together, makes them feel the need of one another, be considerate of one another, understand one another. But, above all things, it is a promoter of equality. It is by the humanity of their manners that men are made equal. ... A community having humane manners is a community of equals, and in such a community great social inequalities have really no meaning, while they are at the same time a menace and an embarrassment to perfect ease of social intercourse. 22

In his conception of equality, therefore, Arnold exalts both the individual and organized society: justice demands that individuals be given equal opportunity for perfection through the state, or, in other words, through the greatest strength and unity of the community of man's "best self".

In comparing the positions taken by Carlyle and Arnold on the culture of democracy, therefore, we see that both men, acting on a strong sense of justice, strive to maintain the humanistic tradition in the face of narrow, static, monolithic middle-class thought. Both men



fear the popular negative interpretation of liberty and freedom: to them, freedom is not purely an escape from the authority of society. Rather, society is the humanizing and civilizing influence whereby the community inspires the individual's fulfillment in both creative work and human affection. However, while Carlyle's comments on the dangers to the individual from the culture of democratic civilization are as penetrating as Arnold's, Carlyle's uncontrolled enthusiasm and blind intolerance. fail to give his writing the lasting persuasiveness that one finds in Arnold's clear, urbane arguments. Again, Carlyle and Arnold differ in their vision of the humanistic ideal, much in the same way in which their concepts of God differ: for Carlyle, whose God is demanding, stern, omnipotent, and anthropomorphic, the "hero" or humanistic ideal is a man of super-human powers and insights demanding obedience of his inferiors; for Arnold, whose the God is non-anthropomorphic tendency in man to strive towards perfection, "culture", or the humanistic ideal, is a process perfecting man socially, morally, and intellectually. Although Carlyle's "heroes" are more tangible and precise than Arnold's "culture" and "State". the heroes, usually examples of human beings in history, often are ineffective anachronisms, whose human faults may shade or eclipse their heroic virtues. Culture and




the State, being flexible, progressive, and expansive concepts, are more lasting and universally acceptable ideals of human perfection. The historical sense of modern man demands flexibility not rigidity, and progression not inactivity in the ideal of human perfection; without such an ideal man's freedom and very humanity is in jeopardy. The danger in Arnold's State is that it is an almost mystical abstraction calling upon a religious reverence, and when an abstraction so revered is translated into the concrete forms of individual men and specific institutions, it can too easily become the state as hero in a powerful and terrifying way, as Hitler and Orwell's portrayal of "Big Brother" in 1984 have led us to perceive.




Accepting the assumption of the German Romantic critics that literature is of paramount importance in indicating and forming the mental or spiritual health of individuals and of society, Carlyle and Arnold became in their works, increasingly critical of their nineteenthcentury industrial and democratic civilization. Following the conservative tradition of social criticism established by the romantic poets and critics of the late eighteenth-century Weimar Republic, and, as well, the native English tradition of social criticism in the vein of Burke and Coleridge, Carlyle and Arnold embellished and intensified the swelling tide of criticism of civilization itself. The force and clarity of their penetrating insights into the ills of modern civilization lent momentum to carry this tradition of criticism on into the twentieth-century, wherein "the characteristic element of modern literature, or at least of the most highly developed modern literature, is the bitter line of hostility to civilization which runs through it."

As we have seen, one of the major concerns of the critics of nineteenth-century civilization is the debasing effects on the individual of industrialization.



Whereas men like Ruskin and Marx are particularly concerned with the degradation of industrial workers by their work, however, Carlyle and Arnold turn their attention elsewhere. Carlyle, in fact, sees all work as the source of salvation. At least in his early writings. Carlyle's doctrine of work, like Goethe's doctrine of "bildung", stresses the need for the balanced and harmonious development of the individual by cultivating his particular inate capabilities and by utilizing his immediate environment: he tells us to translate the general precept "know thyself ... into his particular possible one, Know what thou canst work at. " Combining romantic theories of instinct with his native Calvinism, he stresses the need for reliance on the unconscious moral knowledge existing in man from before the fall. By emphasizing the instinctive, the organic, and the natural faculties of man, in an age which he, like Blake, feels to be stiflingly and mechanically intellectual. Carlyle seeks to establish a healthy state of balance in man's faculties, and by emphasizing duty, a compound of uncalculating sympathy and religious obligation, he hopes to achieve order and integration in society, though ultimately his idea of duty becomes rather too Prussian.

Like Carlyle, Arnold too regrets the fragmenting of the individual and the loss of communal feeling.



Arnold's concept of "culture" opposes the tendencies of laissez-faire government and "the dismal science" of classical economics to destroy social cohesion and to narrow and materialize human values. Like Carlyle's maxim "the soul is not synonymous with the stomach." Arnold's attack on "machinery" voices distaste for the utilitarian's viewing of material things as ends in themselves. Like Goethe, Burke, Coleridge, Newman, Marx, Butler, and Mill, both Carlyle and Arnold advocate the diverse and harmonious expansion of all man's human capacities. Both, however, fall short of this ideal of diversity and totality: Carlyle's predisposition for stern moralizing causes him to neglect pleasure and beauty, whereas Arnold's concerted attempts to cure English vulgarity -- deficiency in "sweetness and light", especially in reason -- cause him to be intolerant of man's "animal" self or self-interestedness.

In attempting to counteract the disintegration of religious ideals and values, Arnold shows "a practical anchorage for the spirit" in the canon of the world's best literature: "Poetry", says Arnold in his essay on "Wordsworth", "is at bottom a criticism of life; ... the greatness of a poet lies in his powerful and beautiful applications of ideas to life, -- to the question:

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How to live." Carlyle, meanwhile, advocates that the

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spiritually bewildered and isolated modern man should obey the moral guidance of the "hero". Both men see religion as a condition of inner enlightenment, not as theology or metaphysics. Carlyle's faith is "transcendental", a mystical conviction; Arnold on the other hand, seems to be excluding the miraculous and the mysterious in favor of a faith guided by reason, but in his view that "the Eternal not Ourselves that makes for righteousness" can be discerned at work in history, he is, perhaps, as mystical as Carlyle, and not too far from Carlyle's Germanic doctrine of "becoming".

Rationality, in Carlyle's view, however, was a faculty almost totally foreign to the "multitudes" in a democracy, and upon their gaining political control through the extended franchise of 1867, they cast Carlyle into near panic. Mill, on the other side, assumed rationality to be universal, and hence championed the democratic movement. Arnold stood between these two positions.

Accepting democracy as a fact in modern politics, as Carlyle refused to do, Arnold took a more realistic and practical approach to man's capacities by striving to develop his latent rationality and creativity: Carlyle's comments on democracy were largely reactionary, narrow, and less valuable than Arnold's. Arnold, being equally critical of the tendency of individuals in a democracy to



prize and attain mediocrity at the expense of "aristocratic" values, reacted in an almost opposite way by applauding impulses toward a classless community through
equality of manners, and, also by applauding the progressiveness inherent in a fluid democratic society.

The loss in a modern democratic society of the traditional "aristocratic" values of right reason and of the pursuit of excellence, the sense of perverse insularity cutting men off from the once meaningful traditions of "right reason", of the cultivated "best self", of heroic moral leadership -- all compel Carlyle and Arnold to advocate authority. Carlyle models his "hero" after an ideal "aristocracy of talent", whether an operative feudal aristocrat or modern, though modified, "captain of industry". The hero is the nation's guiding moral force. His sincerity, honesty, and insight makes him "a seer; /by his ability to see/ through the show of things" and also enables him to remodel outworn institutions and customs to meet current needs. "If he be not a Priest / a believer in the divine truth of things ! /," says Carlyle of the hero, "he will never be good for much as a Reformer." The hero's just leadership merits the perfect obedience of his followers. Similarly. Arnold's authoritarian, though rather more nebulous. "State" preserves and extends the "national right reason".

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Perfecting individuals of all classes through developing and expanding their distinctively human faculties to their fullest possible extent, the State ultimately provides a practical solution to modern man's anxious and persistent search for values. Both hero and "state are answers to the desire for cohesion, order, and purpose in a society felt to be disintegrating into anarchy.

Transferring Carlyle's theory of the hero and Arnold's theory of the State from high sounding ideals into practical political and social institutions, one immediately discerns dangers to individual freedom such as we have later seen in fascist and communist authoritarian states. These dangers, nevertheless, must not obscure the evils of civilization which Carlyle and Arnold point out and attack. Making much the same comment on Arnold's "State" as E. Cassirer makes on Carlyle's "hero", Lionel Trilling states:

He /Arnold/ protested the practicability of his theory. His essentially mystic conception of the State reads almost like a Platonic myth, but, for good or ill, the research of theoretical politics seems to proceed on myths. Divine law, natural right, the state of nature, the social contract, the general will, "national blood"--all of them, the liberating and the debasing, are myths, partial and undemonstrable, constructs embodying complex assumptions and desires, and Arnold's State is but such another. The value of any myth cannot depend on its demonstrability as a fact, but only on the value of the attitudes it embodies, the further attitudes it endangers and the actions it motivates. In these respects Arnold's myth is still fertile and valuable--and morally inescapable.

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With the questioning of the divine right of kings during the renaissance and the final denial of divine right during the French Revolution, the traditional metaphysical foundations of civilization were no longer held to be sacred. Although Burke says that "religion is the basis of civil society" he bases his whole theory and practice of politics on precedent and is therefore much more concrete in his political theory than the French and American abstract theorists of "self-evident natural rights" which ultimately rest on instinct and the irrational. Carlyle's "hero" and Arnold's "State", like Burke's interpretation of the English Constitution, are atuned to the divine will. Carlyle's hero had insight and Arnold's State was somewhat Hegelian (1770-1831) and similar to Vico's (1668-1774) cyclical view of the history of civilization -- the three stages: "the divine, the heroic, and the human." The "hero" and the "State" represent two of the early attempts in this period of transition to resolve the anxiety, the ennui, the frenzied activity that accompanies the feeling of the fundamental absurdity and meaninglessness of civilization and of human existence.

II

Arnold and Carlyle as critics of civilization are interesting because they deal with problems in which we

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are still immersed and because their tempers and their conclusions are so varied on the surface, though occasionally so similar in effect. Their arguments, however, are best appreciated not simply in comparison but within the context of a lengthy and continuing tradition. It seems appropriate, therefore, to conclude, not with an extensive examination, but with at least a few roadsigns to indicate the direction the discourse they are engaged in has taken since their time.

In the twentieth century these critical discussions of civilization have multiplied and have reached a degree of urgency never before encountered in our western civilization. D.H. Lawrence, Joseph Conrad. Aldous Huxley. T.S. Eliot, E.M. Forster, George Orwell, Arthur Koestler, and William Golding, to name only prominent writers in English, all continue this criticism of civilization and most of them write with an awareness of the wider context of similar works by Hesse, Mann, Freud, Kafka, Malraux, Sartre, Camus, Silone, and others. However, in this tradition of English writers D.H. Lawrence, in his essay on "Nottingham and the Mining Countryside" (1929) condemns. "the base forcing of all human energy into a competition of mere acquisition" in a manner reminiscent of Carlyle's denunciation of the mechanical "Profit-and-Loss Philosophy" of the utilitarians, just as Eliot's The Wasteland

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(1936) echoes the spiritual sterility of Arnold's Dover Beach (1867). Orwell, in 1984 (1949) attacks the perversion of the machinery of civilization -- its institutions and technical knowledge--by politicians who abandon the humanitarian ideals of liberty and justice. Later, in Lord of the Flies (1955), Golding represents evil as an internal condition of human nature, suggesting that a major reason why man fails to create an orderly and satisfying civilization is that man habitually projects the daemonic side of his nature onto externals rather than admit responsibility for all his actions. "Fancy thinking the Beast was something you could hunt and kill!," says the Lord of the Flies to the young "mystic", Simon, "You knew, didn't you? I'm part of you? ... I'm the reason why its no go? Why things are what they are?" Carlyle knew this, but he chose to see light coming out of darkness, and in the end presumed to be capable of controlling the process.

zation (1955) and Norman O. Brown's Life Against Death (1959) attack, in psychoanalytical terms, the repressive nature of modern civilization which Freud observed but accepted in Civilization and Its Discontents. Marcuse, for example, suggests the possibility of replacing the present reality principle, represented by Prometheus,

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"the culture - hero of toil, productivity, and progress through repression," (and a central symbol of Sartor Resartus) by the opposite reality principle represented by the culture-heroes of Orpheus, Narcissus, and Dionysus--"the image/s/ of joy and fulfillment." Brown and Marcuse echoing Heine to a large extent, see man as a creature whose fear of death causes him anxiety. In an attempt to escape his anxiety he represses his sexual instincts by creating a repressive civilization. In their pleas for a "sexual utopia" Brown and Marcuse represent a contemporary strain in the criticism of civilization that Trilling describes in his work Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture (1955):

Freud, once attacked for the extravagance of his sexual emphasis, is now, by people of no little seriousness, said to be puritanical in his view of sexuality, surrendering to civilization and to achievement in civilization far more of impulse than there was any need to surrender.


The sexual theme might at first seem remote from Arnold's and Carlyle's worries, but their emphasis on sterility and submersion of the merely "animal" man show at least that it bothers them, though they side more with Freud with than Heine, Lawrence, Brown, and Marcuse.

Another much more widely considered and widely accepted criticism of civilization in the twentieth-century, however, is Camus's theory of the "absurd". Camus in

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The Myth of Sisyphus (1955) defines the absurd man as: "He who, without negating it, does nothing for the eternal ... he prefers his courage and his reasoning. The first teaches him to live without appeal and to get along with what he has: the second informs him of his In Camus's view, man, like Sisyphus in the Greek myth, is condemned to forever roll a boulder up to the crest of a mountain only to watch "the stone rush down in a few moments towards that lower world whence he will have to push it up again towards the summit." Sisyphus, the absurd man, has his moment of victory during his return to the rock when, realizing his misery, he continues his revolt and scorn against the gods and becomes superior to the rock, to his destiny, and to the universe since he is no longer controlled and deceived through a false hope of immortality and a benevolent god. With such a freedom, concludes Camus, "One must imagine Sisyphus happy." Such a view starts out from the same sense of meaninglessness and futility that informs the despairing beginning of Sartor Resartus and Arnold's poetry; but in Camus's view both would be guilty of evasion by hope, the "trickery of those who live not for life itself but for some great idea that will transcend it, refine it, give it a meaning, and betray it."

To conclude that the condition of modern civiliza-



tion is unique, that modern man alone is plagued by de-Spair, ennui, isolation, and a meaningless existence, is, of course, by no means true. Rather, the modern mind is now especially conscious of another dimension of man's existence, realizes another side to his complex nature. Without the solace of the "unconscious" and mystical beliefs of past generations, modern man as Camus sees him, finds himself forced into confronting the overpowering reality of his inhuman and amoral universe. However. man's freedom need no longer be jeopardized by a civilization created to sustain some mystical "great idea". Civilization may now be remodeled according to purely human needs and circumstances and this remodeling is one of the primary aims of the criticism of civilization. By focusing his attention on concerns of earthly life, however, man still seems to create as many problems as he solves.

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FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. Carlyle, Works, Vol. III, p. 18. 2. ibid., p. 16. 3. Arnold, On the Classical Tradition, p. 32. 4. ibid., pp. 33-34. 5. Milton, Prose Selections, p. 234. 6. Babbitt, Rousseau and the Romantics, p. 119. 7. Miller, Victorian Studies, p. 210. 8. Schiller. Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, p. 258. 9. Rinehardt, The Existentialist Revolt, p. 246. 10. Miller, p. 211. 11. Arnold, Lectures and Essays in Criticism, Vol. III, p. 109. 12. Heller, p. 148. 13. ibid., p. 149. 14. Nietzsche, p. 117. 15. ibid., p. 96. 16. ibid., p. 83. 17. Freud, p. 44.
18. Trilling, "On the Modern Element in Modern Literature", Partisan Review, p. 10.
19. ibid., p. 29. 20. Coleridge, p. 51. 21. Williams, p. 77. 22. Bruford, pp. 4-5. 23. Kroeber and Kluckhorn, Culture, a Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. 24. Mill, On Bentham and Coleridge, p. 130. 25. Avey, History of Philosophy, p. 168. 26. Bruford, p. 205. 27. Schiller, p. 258. 28. ibid., p. 230. 29. Burke, p. 181. 30. Coleridge, p. 51. 31. Newman, p. xxxviii. 32. Marx, p. 396. 33. Ruskin, Prose of the Victorian Period, p. 371. 34. Mill, p. 62. 35. Butler, p. 179.

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      2. Carlyle, Works, Vol. III, pp. 4-5.
      3. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 216.
      4. Whitney, p. 1.
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      6. Harrold, p. 217.
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      10. Sabine, History of Political Theory, p. 605.
11. Carlyle, "Signs of the Times", Works, Vol. II,
pp. 64-65.
      12. Encyclopaedia Britanica, "Kant", Vol. XIII,
p. 267.
      13. Encyclopaedia Britanica, "Fichte", Vol. IX.
   215.
      14. Carlyle. "Shooting Niagara: and After". Works.
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p. 5.
      16. ibid., p. 8.
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      19. ibid., p. 15.
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      21. ibid., pp. 15-16, 29.
      22. Carlyle, p. 214.
      23. Carlyle, pp. 148-149.
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      28. ibid., p. 221.
      29. ibid., pp. 159, 233-234.
      30. Froude, Vol. II, p. 309.
      31. Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, p. 259.
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      33. ibid., pp. 28-29.
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       39. Lehman, Carlyle's Theory of the Hero, p. 54.
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      56. Emerson, Complete Works, Vol. IV, p. 61. 57. Carlyle, Works, Vol. V, pp. 1-2.
      58. Rickard, History of England, p. 189. 59. Carlyle, Works, Vol. V, pp. 4, 9.
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63. Carlyle, p. 232.
64. Carlyle, "Shooting Niagara", Works, Vol. V,
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      65. Williams, p. 89.
      66. Carlyle, Works, Vol. III, p. 28.
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1. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, pp. 49-50.

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3. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 49.

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5. ibid., p. 96.

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11. Burke, p. 179.
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13. Mill, On Bentham and Coleridge, pp. 129-130.
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      15. Arnold, Letters of Matthew Arnold, p. 111
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      17. ibid., p. 132.
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      21. ibid., p. 54.
      22. ibid., pp. xv-xvi.
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      24. ibid., pp. 140-141.
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      27. ibid., p. 20.
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      30. ibid., pp. 111-112.
      31. ibid., p. 122.
      32. ibid., p. 122.
      33. ibid., p. 121.
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      36. ibid., pp. 227, 229-230.
      37. Arnold, p. 151.
      38. Arnold, Matthew Arnold, p. 251.
      39. ibid., pp. 191-192, 11. 29-37. 40. ibid., p. 272.
      41. ibid., p. 212, 11. 201-206.
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      44. ibid., p. 170, 11. 261-264, 275-278.
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      47. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 124.
      48. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France,
p. 235.
      49. Arnold, The Portable Matthew Arnold, pp. 243-244.
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52. Arnold, <u>Culture and Anarchy</u>, p. 166.
      53. Trilling, pp. 260-261.
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      56. Mill, p. 95.
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- 58. Avey, History of Philosophy, p. 180.
- 59. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, pp. 66-67.
- 60. Mill, p. 212.
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 - 2. Carlyle, Works, Vol. V, pp. 17-18.
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 6. ibid., p. 150.
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 - 20. ibid., pp. 582-583.
- 21. Sherman, Matthew Arnold, p. 290.
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 - 2. Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, p. 163.
 3. Sherman, Matthew Arnold, p. 271.

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 - 5. Carlyle, Heroes and Hero-Worship, p. 116.
 - 6. Trilling, Matthew Arnold, p. 255.
 - 7. Tindall, James Joyce, p. 71.
 - 8. Lawrence, Phoenix, p. 138.

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9. Golding, p. 177.
10. Marcuse, pp. 146-147.
11. above, Ch. III, p. 58, n. 35.
12. Trilling, p. 28.
13. Camus, p. 50.
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
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